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CRIMINOLOGY
THE EMPIRICS OF PRISON GROWTH: A
CRITICAL REVIEW AND PATH FORWARD
JOHN F. PFAFF*
A growing empirical literature has sought to explain the forces behind the
significant expansion of the U.S. prison population over the past thirty
years. Unfortunately, the studies to date have suffered from important
methodological, conceptual, and definitional problems that have
significantly curtailed their ability to identify causal effects. In this Article,
I examine several of the central limitations and discuss remedies. I start by
reviewing the theories that investigators have sought to test. I then discuss
the studies' empirical defects, such as failing to account for endogenous
relationships, overlooking the risk of model dependency, ignoring complex
dynamic relationships, using variables that either do not correctly measure
the relevant theory or do not isolate it from competing claims, and relying
consistently on the same source of data. I also propose several remedies to
these and other shortcomings. The current literature has begun to shed
light on the forces driving prison growth, but more carefully designed
models are needed before we can be confident in the findings.
1. INTRODUCTION
The single most striking statistic in the American criminal justice
system is its thirty-year expansion in prison population. From 300,000
prisoners in 1977, the prison population has risen steadily to over 1.5
million as of June 30, 2005, a 400% increase. By 2005, states were
collectively spending over $43 billion per year on corrections. That this
followed nearly fifty years of relative stability makes the growth all the
more remarkable.
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. I would like to thank David
Abrams, Kenworthey Bilz, David Greenberg, Bernard Harcourt, Tracey Meares, Tom Miles,
and Daniel Richman, as well as participants at the University of Chicago's Crime and
Punishment Workshop, for many helpful comments. All errors are my own.
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This growth touches on myriad major social issues: how governments
have responded to declining faith in the welfare state; how the American
legal system-and American society more generally-treats its minority
and poorer citizens; how states and counties allocate their scarce financial
resources, and how the federal government influences theses decisions; how
governments respond to shifting patterns in crime and social disorder. Not
surprisingly, given its far-reaching effects and implications, the prison
system's growth has spawned a large literature examining the causes,
implications, and justifications (or lack thereof) for this profound shift in
the use of incarceration.
I have two goals in this Article: to provide a systematic analysis of
what we know about the forces that have driven this growth, and to set forth
a framework for producing more reliable and accurate results in the future.
In particular, I evaluate an empirical literature that spans criminology,
economics, law, political science, and sociology. While hundreds of
articles and dozens of books have been written about recent trends in U.S.
prison populations, most have been predominantly normative or historical
in their approaches. A small core of articles, however, has attempted to
evaluate the factors influencing these trends using sophisticated empirical
models, and it is on these that I focus. That is not to say at all that the other
approaches are unimportant, but they require a different sort of evaluation.
An accurate empirical understanding of prison growth is vital for
policy planners of all stripes. Reformers concerned with the magnitude of
the prison population may not know whether to focus on the adoption of
sentencing guidelines, more expansive representation for the indigent, or
the use of commission-drafted fiscal impact statements unless they know
whether the growth of the prison population has been driven by racial
inequalities, the poverty of defendants, or legislative budgetary concerns.
Conversely, those who support incarceration for utilitarian or other
normative (e.g., retributive) reasons need to understand the factors driving
its expansion to assess its appeal. A clearer appreciation of how we got
here and where we are heading benefits everyone-from fiscal
conservatives to social liberals.
I find, however, that in general the current empirical literature answers
these questions poorly. Those who study prison populations have settled on
a well-defined set of widely accepted explanatory theories. But the efforts
to test these theories suffer from numerous important limitations that inhibit
their ability to identify causal effects accurately. That is not to say that we
know nothing at this point, but our current knowledge is quite rough.
In this Article, I set out to accomplish two specific tasks. First, I flesh
out what it is that we know, and (of equal importance) what we do not
know. Though limited, the current findings do provide some useful
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insights. In particular, the studies point to seven broad claims, four with
respect to prison admissions and three with respect to total population.
First, the studies suggest that the admissions rate increases with the crime
rate, the percent of the population between the ages of twenty-four and
thirty-five, and the percent of the population that is black; and falls with
personal income per capita. The studies provide fewer insights for the
models looking at total prison population, due at least in part to complex
(and unaddressed) dynamic features of those models. Nonetheless, the
results imply that total prison population rises with the crime rate, the
percent of the population between eighteen and thirty-five, and the percent
of the population that is black.
Second, as part of a larger empirical project looking at prison growth,'
I discuss numerous methodological limitations with the current studies and
improvements that will lead to more accurate and stable results. I focus on
four concerns in particular: that models (1) suffer from uncorrected
endogenous relationships; (2) exhibit little stability within and across
articles, either due to problems of omitted variable bias or deeper structural
limitations; (3) rely on poorly chosen variables (both dependent and
independent); and (4) consistently use the same data rather than looking for
alternative sources of information. Of course, in a world of limited and
sometimes flawed data, it may prove impossible to satisfy a theoretical gold
standard, and it is important not to cross the thin line between idealism ("we
can do it better") and nihilism ("we will never be able to do it well
enough")-or at least not without caution (and evidence). Some of the
problems with the current studies can be overcome to produce increasingly
reliable results, and I explore several such possibilities in this Article. But
it also important to identify those issues that are, at least for now,
intractable, and to consider the implications of such blind spots.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II lays out the broad trends in
prison population and discusses the various theories developed over the
years to explain them. Part III then critically reviews the current empirical
literature, identifying the insights we can draw from it and highlighting the
1 See John F. Pfaff, Prison Population Growth: A Comprehensive Empirical Model
(2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (implementing many of the suggestions
in this Article to develop a more precise model of the causal factors that have influenced
prison growth) [hereinafter Pfaff, Prison Population Growth]; John F. Pfaff, Sentencing
Guidelines, Prison Populations, and Crime Rates: A Cost-Benefit Analysis (2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (exploring how guideline adoption influences
both crime rates and correctional expenditures) [hereinafter Pfaff, Sentencing Guidelines];
John F. Pfaff, Trends in Prison Release: Evidence from the National Corrections Reporting




open questions. Part IV focuses on several significant improvements for
future efforts that lead to more reliable results.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRISON GROWTH
A. TRENDS IN THE USE OF PRISON
Figure 1 is by now well known. The U.S. prison population fluctuated
gently from the 1920s to the 1970s, but by the late 1970s it had started a
slow and steady expansion that has continued unabated ever since. State
expenditures on corrections grew rapidly during this period as well: data
from the Census suggest that the share of state expenditures dedicated to
corrections grew by approximately 4% per year during the 1980s and
1990s, reaching nearly $43 billion in 2005. And these numbers ignore the
collateral implications of prison growth, such as its effects on inmates (both
while in prison and after), their families, and their communities.
Figure 1





1920 19401 960 1980 200
Year
Historical Data - BJS Data
Sources:
1925 to 1986: Bureau of Just. Stats.: Historical Staistics on Prisoners in State and Federal
Institutions, Year End 1925-1986.
1977 to 2004: BJS website: httpl/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs.
Showing that prison populations have soared is easy; explaining why
they have is more difficult. Figure 2 suggests one reason why simple
solutions may be hard to find. This Figure plots the variation in annual
state incarceration rates between 1977 and 2004. It is clear that growth in
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the U.S. prison population has been accompanied by a divergence in state
behavior. The rate of growth has varied widely across the states: between
1977 and 2004, prison population grew by only 59% in North Carolina, but
by 678% in North Dakota and 538% in Mississippi.'
Figure 2










Source: BJS website: http:/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs.
Because of extreme values that noticeaby atten the figure, Washington, D.C. Is omitted.
The trends in expenditures appear to be less divergent. Figure 3 plots
the variation in the percent of state budgets dedicated to corrections. As in
Figure 2, the average rises slowly and steadily, but in Figure 3 the range
between the upper and lower bounds appears relatively stable. No state
appears to dedicate more than 5.8% of its budget to corrections in a given
year. Nonetheless, in 1998 over $30 billion was spent on corrections; in
2005, nearly $43 billion. Regardless of whether this is too much or too
little-a challenging normative and empirical question beyond the scope of
this Article-the total amount, along with the number of people
incarcerated, indicates the critical importance of understanding the
dynamics of prison growth.
2 North Carolina's seeming laxity is deceptive. Its rate of growth is low because in the
late 1970s it often had the highest incarceration rate in the nation. By 2004, its incarceration
was below the national average, but not by much: 359 per 100,000, compared to 488 per
100,000 nationally.







Percent of State Budgets Spent on Corrections, 19 77-1998




1960 1985 1990 1995
Source: Bureau of the Census, Annual Survey of Govis, Finance Statistics, various years.
Data available on-line at httpJ/vww.icpsr.umich.edu.
Two observations have been omitted: Arbio in 1983 and South Carolina in 1990.
The first reported 11%, more than twice the second-highest value (5.4%).
The second repofted 13%, more than four times the second-highest value (3.6%).
These appear to be errors.
B. THE GENERAL THEORIES OF PRISON GROWTH
Though the issue of relatively short-term prison population trends has
only recently attracted significant scholarly attention, the prison as an
institution has long been studied. Among the most prominent to explore its
role in society are tmile Durkheim, Max Weber, Michel Foucault, and
Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer.3 Durkheim considers the historical
rise of the prison, arguing that it becomes the primary form of punishment
as a society matures.4 His concern, however, is not with the trends in prison
populations over several years within a society, but instead with the
evolution of prison's use as the society itself develops. Weber focuses
more on the rationalization of punishment, examining its centralization and
use of hierarchical systems, uniformity, specialization, penal infrastructure,
3 DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY (1990), provides a
comprehensive overview of the works of Durkheim, Weber, Foucault, Rusche and
Kirchheimer, and the concerns raised by their critics. Franklin Zimring and Gordon
Hawkins likewise present a lucid summary of these issues. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING &
GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT (1991).
4 tmile Durkheim, The Evolution of Punishment, in DURKHEIM AND THE LAW 114
(Steven Lukes & Andrew Scull eds., 1983).
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and professionalism. 5  And Foucault, like Durkheim, explores how the
prison developed at a macro level, tying its birth to the growing efforts by
the state to control its citizens.
6
Despite their importance to our understanding of the prison as an
institution, these canonical sociological works provide little insight into the
question of recent prison population trends. The one notable exception is
the work of Rusche and Kirchheimer, which in fact explicitly considers
prison population change during a given historical era. Rusche and
Kirchheimer adopt a political-economic perspective, arguing that prison
policies adapt to reflect changes in the labor market: the tighter the labor
market, the less incarceration is used. While admitting that non-economic
factors matter, they assert the centrality of economic forces.
Given the general absence of scholarship looking at prison population
trends-and one could never expect scholars writing before the 1970s and
1980s to predict the subsequent explosion-recent researchers have
developed new theories, and built on the old, to explain prison growth.
Their efforts fall into four broad schools of thought: the "crime theory,"
which links prison populations to crime rates; the "economic theory," to the
importance of labor market and economics conditions; the "demographics
theory," to shifts in race and age; and the "political theory," to changes in
political ideology or manipulation by politicians seeking reelection. 8 Four
other, less overarching theories have been noted as well: the
deinstitutionalization of the mental health system, the expansion of prison
capacity, the imposition of population caps by federal courts, and the fiscal
health of the states. Each of these theories also provides important insights
into the mechanics of population growth. I will consider each in turn.
1. The Crime Theory
The crime theory posits that a powerful factor influencing
incarceration rates is crime. Its simplest version is quite intuitive: rising
crime rates should increase prison admissions and populations (and declines
in crime should lead to corresponding reductions, perhaps with a lag). Yet
5 See GARLAND, supra note 3, at 177-92.
6 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 231 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books
2d ed. 1995) (1977). Zimring and Hawkins note that "[a]part from parenthetical references
Foucault does not discuss the determinants of prison population or demonstrate any interest
in such matters." ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 3, at 45-48.
7 GEORG RUCHE & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 3-7 (1939).
8 Michael Tonry, Thinking About Crime, ch. 2 (2004), lists eight, not four, schools of
thought. His eight, however, are essentially incorporated within three of the categories here;
he does not consider the economic theories.
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this theory has often been viewed with suspicion. 9 Perhaps this is due in
part to the graphical evidence. As Figure 4 demonstrates, between 1960
and 2004 crime and incarceration did not move in a highly synchronized
manner.
Figure 4











Source BJ5 website hitp I ww[ojp usdoj govs
Property crimes are divided by 10 to fit on same es
In the 1970s, Alfred Blumstein attempted to establish the lack of a
crime/prison-population connection more rigorously. Along with Soumyo
Moitra, he argued that a complex feedback loop linked crime and
incarceration to keep the prison population constant. Their theory held that
as crime rises and drives up the prison population, the minimum level of
deviance needed for incarceration rises as a counterweight, keeping the
prison population relatively fixed regardless of the crime rate.1° Blumstein
later recanted this theory in light of the prison population boom that started
9 Zimring and Hawkins, along with Alfred Blumstein and Allen Beck, find the theory
wanting while acknowledging that there is likely some relationship. Alfred Blumstein &
Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980-1996, in PRISONS (Michael Tonry &
Joan Petersilia eds., 1999); ZIMRfNG & HAWKTNS, supra note 3, at ch. 5.
10 Alfred Blumstein & Soumyo Moitra, An Analysis of Time Series of the Imprisonment
Rate in the States of the United States: A Further Test of the Stability of Punishment
Hypothesis, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 376, 376 (1979).
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in the 1970s, 1 but he has continued to argue that the relationship between
crime and punishment is weak. In a recent article written with Allen Beck,
he states that only 12% of the growth in state prison populations between
1980 and 1996 was tied to changes in offending (with the remaining 88%
due to increased incarcerations and longer sentences).12 And Blumstein is
not alone. Zimring and Hawkins, for example, echo his views, pointing to
evidence that suggests that a single incarceration occurs for every 100
felonies committed.1
3
Nonetheless, it appears that crime does in fact influence the
incarceration rate. The studies below that include measures of the crime
rate consistently find a positive relationship between crime-violent crime
in particular-and prison populations or admissions. Moreover, recent
work suggests that these estimates understate the true effect because they
ignore the simultaneous relationship between prisons and crime.'
4
2. The Economic Theory
The economic theory suggests that underlying economic conditions are
powerful forces driving prison populations. Rusche and Kirchheimer's
book is often considered the seminal work in this field.' 5 It argues that
penal practices respond to labor conditions: the more abundant labor is, the
less care the penal system shows to those who fall within its grasp. David
Rothman and Michael Ignatieff built on this political-economy theory to
claim that the prison was developed to reassert control and social stability
as capitalism undermined the ancien regime and its traditional forms of
control.16
Rusche and Kirchheimer's theory, however, suffers from several
shortcomings, which David Garland lays out clearly. In particular, prisons
often operate at a loss and thus not (as Rusche and Kirchheimer claim) to
the benefit of the state; penal practices often differ across states and
countries with similar economic conditions; and ideology and politics
1 See Alfred Blumstein, Prisons, in CRIME 388 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds.,
1995). Kevin Reitz criticizes the article by Blumstein and Moitra, noting that its "stability
thesis fit well with the prior trends of [Blumstein and Moitra's] own lifetime[s] up to the
1970s," but that it is dangerous to "generalize one's contemporary experiences to other eras
and to the future." Kevin R. Reitz, Zimring, Hawkins, and the Macro Problems of
Imprisonment, 87 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604, 610-11 (1997).
12 Blumstein & Beck, supra note 9, at 43.
13 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 3, at 124.
14 Yair Listokin provides clear evidence of this, as discussed in Part III below.
t5 See RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 7.
16 MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION (1978); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER
AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1990).
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surely play a role.' 7 Furthermore, such a theory over-anthropomorphizes
capitalism. Penal practices can shape and control the labor market only if
there is a high degree of coordination between police, judges, and non-legal
actors in the business world. 18 Ignatieff, at least, later openly backed away
from his own argument, admitting that revisionist histories of the prison,
including his own 1978 work, "contained three basic misconceptions": they
overstated the state's monopoly of social control, the centrality of the
state's "moral authority" to "social order," and the extent to which "all
social relations can be described in the language of subordination."'
19
Note, however, that even if Rusche and Kirchheimer and their
successors failed to develop a convincing overarching theory, they are right
to draw our attention to the potential importance of economic conditions.
Judges may be more willing to sentence the unemployed, and to sentence
them to longer sentences. 20  And poverty can encourage crime and thus
increase prison populations. In these cases, unemployment influences
incarceration even though the judges are not involved directly in macro-
level social control. When unemployment is higher, judges are simply
more likely to face unemployed defendants at sentencing (and to give them
longer sentences). Furthermore, greater income inequality may make the
"underclass" appear more "different," leading judges-perhaps
unconsciously-to sentence such defendants more harshly. Thus while
theories of coordinated social control are problematic, it remains important
to evaluate how economic factors operate in less direct, but still important,
ways.
17 GARLAND, supra note 3, at 105-10.
18 David Rothman criticizes similar theories that assert that the commonalities between
Jacksonian-era prisons and factories came about as an effort to train workforces in prison.
Rothman suggests that the more likely answer is that wardens and foremen alike operated
from the same set of basic assumptions about organization. David J. Rothman, Perfecting
the Prison: United States, 1789-1865, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE
PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 111-29 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman
eds., 1995).
19 Michael Ignatieff, State, Civil Society, and Total Institutions: A Critique of Recent
Social Histories of Punishment, 3 CRIME & JUST. 153, 156-57 (1981).
20 Of course, we need to ask why judges do this. The theory proposed by Rusche and
Kirchheimer suggests that they do so in the name of society-level social control. Perhaps a
more straightforward explanation is that judges take into account the social costs of their
decisions, and the costs could be greater on average when incarcerating an employed person
(since, for example, he may provide for his family more than an unemployed person). Or
given the correlation between unemployment and recidivism, judges may act more
preemptively in these cases. Furthermore, some state guidelines, such as those in North
Carolina, explicitly instruct judges to consider employment as a mitigating factor.
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3. Demographic Theories
Demographic trends, especially changing age and race distributions,
are also thought to influence the incarceration rate. The theories for age are
relatively straight-forward. That age profiles and criminality are correlated
is well known. But even controlling for crime rates, there may be a link
between age profiles and incarceration patterns. First, while criminal
behavior often starts in the late pre- and early-teen years, the juvenile
justice system handles almost all offenders below age eighteen. Second,
evidence suggests that adult courts are less willing to sentence the youngest
offenders. Thomas Marvell and Carlisle Moody, for example, have
produced results indicating that judges are more likely to lock up offenders
between the ages of twenty-five to thirty-four than between eighteen and
twenty-four.21  Changing age patterns may therefore shift prison
populations, independently of their effects on crime.
Given the interplay in American society among race, crime, and
incarceration, it should come as no surprise that the theories linking race
and prison populations are more complex (and more extensively discussed)
than those examining age. Three strands in particular deserve attention.
The first is the most direct, focusing on race's influence over day-to-day
decisions concerning arrest, prosecution, and sentencing. This can be
thought of as a theory of "institutional racism," with racial bias manifesting
itself in the quotidian tasks that define the criminal justice system. Police
may be more willing to arrest, district attorneys more willing to prosecute,
juries more willing to convict, and judges more willing to incarcerate
minorities (and to do so for longer terms). This would produce a positive
correlation between the sizes of a jurisdiction's minority and prison
populations. So far, however, most empirical studies examining
institutional racism have focused on its impact on the racial distribution of
prison populations, not on the populations' actual sizes; these studies have
been inconclusive.22 Thus the question of how institutional racism has
influenced the size of the overall prison population remains relatively open.
The second strand emerges from the political theory, linking more
punitive criminal policies to a strategic political backlash against the social
changes of the 1960s, including the civil rights movement. Katherine
Beckett provides a clear exposition of this position, arguing that political
campaigns such as Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential bid attempted to tie
21 Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Age-Structure Trends and Prison
Populations, 25 J. CRIM. JUST. 115, 121 tbl.4 (1997) [hereinafter Marvell & Moody, Age-
Structure Trends].
22 Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and
Criminal Justice in the United States, in ETHNIcITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION 311, 362
(Michael Tonry ed., 1997).
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crime to political dissent, using attacks on the former to quash the latter.23
Randall Kennedy similarly notes that among the many roles race has played
in criminal justice, one has been as a "thinly veiled code" to signal
opposition to the social transformation started in the 1960s, especially with
respect to civil rights.
24
This argument may appear to track Garland's "late modernity" theory
(discussed more below), but it differs in important ways. Garland asserts
that the state turned to law enforcement to justify its authority when it failed
to provide an effective social welfare net; protection from crime was an
effort by the government to gain legitimacy. In a sense, then, the second
strand of the race theory is a cynical variant of Garland's, claiming that the
turn to criminal policy was not a sincere effort to justify the government's
role, but rather a political ploy to undo undesired policies.
The third strand is closely related to the crime theory. Advanced most
strongly by Michael Tonry, it asserts that racial bias helped motivate (and
continues to motivate) the war on drugs, and that this war has subsequently
25played a dominant role in the prison population surge. Tonry argues that
changing arrest patterns fueled the growth in prison populations, with race
playing an important role in these changes. While it is widely accepted that
the war on drugs has had a serious impact on minority (especially urban)
communities, such a result can be blamed on racism only if it was
foreseeable to the drug war's architects. Tonry makes just this claim,
arguing that the effects of a supply-side, prohibitionist (rather than a
demand-side, risk-reduction) approach on urban minority communities
should have been clear to those who designed the policies. Note, though,
that Tonry's argument is equally consistent with racial indifference and
with racial animus.
Though this nation's long-running problems with race have surely
influenced prison populations, each of the three strands above suffers from
important reservations. First, each theory, particularly that of institutional
racism, has a hard time untangling the correlation between race and class.
Not only may police, prosecutors, juries, judges, and parole boards treat
whites better than blacks, but they may treat the rich better than the poor;
even in the absence of any class bias, the rich may be better able to avoid
prison (or longer sentences) because they can hire better lawyers. To the
extent that race and class are correlated, isolating the effect of race may be
difficult, especially with aggregate state-level data.
23 Katherine Beckett asserts that "[c]ategories such as street crime and law and order
were used in an attempt to heighten opposition to the civil rights movement." KATHERINE
BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY 32 (1997).
24 RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 4 (1997).
25 MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT (1995).
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Second, the actual effect of the political and rhetorical use of "crime"
on prison populations is unmeasured. The route from political device to
effective policy is long and complex. Not only is it often difficult for a
legislature to pass a new law, but even once passed administrative
intransigence can thwart meaningful implementation. As Theodore Caplow
and Jonathan Simon note, "It is undeniable that some white Americans
were pleased to see the benefits of the civil rights movement and
affirmative action partly cancelled by the rise in the incarceration of African
Americans, but there is no evidence that such bigotry drives the trend. 26
And finally, while it is undeniable that the war on drugs has had a
disparate racial impact, two concerns with Tonry's argument deserve
attention. First, as work by researchers as diverse as Randall Kennedy and
Steven Levitt has indicated, the impact of the war on drugs may have fallen
disproportionately on the black population, but so too did the harms from
the drug epidemics-crack in particular. 27 Second, the effect of the war on
drugs on overall prison populations is often overstated. Despite large
numbers of arrests, relatively few drug offenders are sent to prison. Drug
offenders make up only 20% of state prisoners; property offenders comprise
20%, and violent offenders 50%.28 Even if every prisoner in 1998 whose
primary offense was a drug charge were released, the total population
would have been approximately 1 million instead of 1.3 million: that is still
more than triple the population in 1977.9
26 Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison Policy and Population
Trends, in PRISONS, supra note 9, at 91. It should be pointed out, though, that Caplow and
Simon provide no evidence in support of their own point other than the absence of evidence
for the other side.
27 Randall Kennedy, for example, once stated in the context of the disparate treatment of
crack and powder cocaine that "the principle problem facing African-Americans in the
context of criminal justice today is not over-enforcement but under-enforcement of laws."
Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination, 107 HARV. L. REv.
1255, 1259 (1994). Steven Levitt and his co-authors have developed an index of crack use
that suggests that such use was highly correlated with negative social outcomes such as
higher murder rates among young men, teenage pregnancies, and low-birth weight babies, at
least during the 1980s. Roland G. Fryer, Paul S. Heaton, Steven D. Levitt & Kevin M.
Murphy, Measuring the Impact of Crack Cocaine 26-28 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 11318, 2005).
28 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics-
Prisons Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
29 There are two important caveats to this claim. First, a drug dealer who kills in the
midst of a drug-market turf war is classified as a violent offender, not a drug-crimes
offender. To the extent that the war on drugs destabilized drug markets and led to greater
violence and more violent offenders, the war on drugs influences non-drug crime trends as
well. Second, drug convictions themselves may not lead to incarceration, but they can count
as prior felonies for the purpose of recidivist enhancements. Thus the time served by felons
convicted of violent and property crimes is determined in part by the war on drugs.
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Race has surely played a role in prison growth. The magnitude of its
role, and where it operates, however, remain open questions.
4. The Political Theories
The ascendant theory concerning recent prison growth ties it to
changes in the political culture of the United States over the past thirty
years. The theory actually consists of three closely related claims. The first
argues that increasingly punitive criminal policies reflect a rightward drift
in political culture and a backlash against a perceived-as-ineffectual welfare
state. The second is a more cynical variant of the first, stating that
politicians from both sides of the aisle use crime scares to lure away (or
keep) voters. And the third posits that crime policy results from the
interaction of moral panics and cyclic views on crime.
David Garland has developed perhaps the most ambitious exposition
of the rightward-drift theory. During the 1970s, two forces intersected: on
the one hand, commitment to the rehabilitative ideal in criminal sentencing
(and elsewhere) collapsed, and on the other hand a series of profound
cultural changes (the oil shocks, the decline of industrialization, changing
marriage patterns and gender roles, increased suburbanization, the rise of
the television, expanding civil rights, and growing moral relativism) shifted
the political views of the populace to the right. This political realignment
caused the criticisms of the rehabilitative ideal to induce not small
adjustments in penal policy but a sea change. As Garland notes, "Broad
social classes that had once supported welfare state policies ... came to
think and feel about the issues quite differently [in the 1980s and 1990s].,,31
The political readjustment undermined support for the welfare state and led
to the introduction of crime control as a substitute for welfare. 32 Perceived
as no longer successfully providing for their citizens, governments sought
legitimacy by protecting people from risk, particularly crime. At the very
least, tough-on-crime policies gave the perception that "something is being
done," regardless of their actual effect.33
The second theory argues that crime is an effective electioneering
device, suggesting that tough-on-crime rhetoric does not necessarily reflect
the ideal views of the candidate. Michael Tonry, for example, argues that
"[i]n times of anticrime hysteria, the safest position on crime issues may be
30 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001).
31 Id. at 75-76.
32 Id. at 100. Garland states that "[i]f the watchwords of post-war social democracy had
been economic control and social liberation, the new politics of the 1980s put in place a
quite different framework of economic freedom and social control." Id.
33 Id. at 133-35; see also Markus D. Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational
Punishment, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 689, 719 (1995).
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the preemptive strike. 34 Theodore Caplow and John Simon similarly claim
that "[i]t is widely accepted that political candidates for statewide office
must establish themselves as favoring more severe punishments to stand a
chance of election., 35 They assert that this is the result of a shift in political
debates over the past thirty years from "traditional class and regional
conflicts, towards conflicts about 'values,"' and that crime is an effective
campaign topic because it is one of the few issues that commands
consensus.36  Katherine Beckett uses survey data to claim that public
concern about crime lags, rather than leads, politicians' rhetoric about its
importance, implying that politicians stoke the fear of crime as an
electioneering device.37
And the final theory is Michael Tonry's claim that current penal
policies arise from a complex relationship between cycles in sensibilities
and moral panics.38 At its heart, Tonry's theory is one of legal endogeneity.
Politicians do not observe a given societal problem-in this case, crime-
and then set about adjusting the laws to fix it. Instead, general sensibilities
and values change in response to the problem, and it is these changes that
solve the problem. The legal changes occur at the same time, but in
response to the cycle in sensibilities, not the social problem. Thus, rising
crime rates harden people's views of crime and criminals, and these
changing social views help drive down crime rates. Legislators then act
with a lag to pass tougher anti-crime measures, but the correlation between
stricter laws and falling crime is (more or less) spurious. That the timing of
laws is endogenous is well-known; Tonry makes a plausible argument that
sentencing laws' correlation with crime is at least somewhat coincidental.
34 TONRY, supra note 25, at 180.
35 Caplow & Simon, supra note 26, at 70; see also JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING
THROUGH CRIME ch. 3 (2007).
36 Caplow & Simon, supra note 26, at 79. Among the reasons for this consensus, they
argue, is the bombardment of images on TV involving crime. Id. at 87-89. It is not
immediately clear, however, that American society focuses more today on sensationalist
news than it did in the past. Caplow and Simon cite the O.J. Simpson trial, but it is
important to remember that the O.J. trial was at least the fifth "Trial of the Century" in the
twentieth century, after Sacco and Venzetti, Leopold and Loeb, the Lindbergh Baby Case,
and the Rosenbergs. Major cities at the turn of the century and before each had several
tabloid newspapers that sought to out-sensationalize each other, at times publishing several
editions a day. Television is blamed for introducing a qualitative change, but this point is
only asserted, never proven, and it is perhaps complicated by the history of tabloid
journalism.
37 BECKETT, supra note 23, at 16.
38 TONRY, supra note 8.
2008]
JOHN F. PFAFF
That the changes in sentencing laws had no impact on incarceration,
however, seems harder to justify.
39
Despite their widespread appeal, however, these political theories
suffer from several defects. Zimring and Hawkins are among the few
scholars to pay attention to them, leveling three central criticisms: political
debate is often symbolic, much tough-on-crime campaigning is waged by
candidates for national office while most crime policy is local, and
bureaucrats-not politicians-are generally in charge of implementing
changes in policy. 40  Indeed, the studies advancing the political theory
rarely if ever discuss the public-choice and principal-agent problems
inherent in criminal law and policy. A politician may make a (sincere)
promise to pass tough anti-crime legislation, for example, but as public-
choice and interest-group theories demonstrate, the route from promise to
passage to implementation is treacherous.
Beckett briefly addresses this issue, discussing the rising strength of
the criminal justice lobbies, especially that of correctional officers in
California.4' She does not, however, discuss the relative strength of
countervailing anti-incarceration lobbies. These need not be defendants'
rights groups (which are most likely weak), but may be any interest
group-such as the education lobby-whose access to funding is threatened
by prison growth. Political scientists who examine state politics closely, in
fact, note that tough-on-crime groups such as prison guard unions and
victims' rights groups, despite the attention they receive in the press, are
rarely among the most powerful of groups; even their fellow travelers, such
as gun rights groups, are generally weaker than educational lobbies and
similar organizations with competing budgetary interests.42
Moreover, even if a law is passed, there is no guarantee that it will be
meaningfully enforced. As Zimring and Hawkins demonstrate, the
decentralization of enforcement among police, prosecutors, and judges
helps each shirk its respective duties.43 Garland considers this possibility as
39 Note that Beckett's findings challenge Tonry's sensibilities hypothesis: to the extent
that politicians move first and only then do people seem to care about crime, Tonry's claim
that politicians are responding to changing sensibilities appears incorrect.
40 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 3, at 125-30.
41 BECKETT, supra note 23, at 97-101.
42 A good review of this literature is provided by Clive S. Thomas & Ronald J. Hrebenar,
Interest Groups in the States, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 100 (Virginia Gray &
Russell L. Hanson eds., 2004).
43 They note that
[n]o single agency need take the blame [for a low level of criminal convictions]. What looks like
a high level of chronic backbiting and buck-passing in the system [between police, prosecutors,
and judges] is really a particular ecology of nonaccountability that works to shield the system
from political responsibility on a more direct basis.
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well, pointing out that the goals of these "administrative actors" are not
those of politicians. In fact, administrative actors view the politicians as "a
troublesome, external force, with different interests and agendas, rather than
an integral part of the permanent organization," and whose policies are not
necessarily favored by the administrative actors. 4 And there is evidence
that administrative actors in fact do not necessarily follow the policies
handed down by politicians. Joanna Shepherd, for example, notes that
while twenty-six states and the federal government passed three-strike laws
in the 1990s, only California has used the law in a meaningful sense; as
many as 90% of all criminals sentenced under a three-strike law have been
sentenced in California. 45 And New York State prosecutors have often
actively evaded the strict sentencing requirements of the Rockefeller Drug
Laws.46
That said, political shifts over the past thirty years have surely
increased prison populations. But the theory must be modeled carefully.
Shifting ideologies influence the behavior of many parties-not just
legislators, but district attorneys, elected (and even appointed) judges,
mayors, governors, even parole boards. And the actions taken by these
actors can exhibit complicated dynamics.47 Unfortunately, as I will show
below, the approaches used to examine the political theory's implications
have generally failed to address these complexities.
5. Four Other Important Factors
While the factors central to the four schools have received much of the
attention, at least four other relevant variables have been contemplated as
well. The first is the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill that has taken
place since the 1970s. Steven Raphael notes that mental hospital inpatient
rates generally declined over the period from 1971 to 1996, sometimes
sharply (in Texas, for example, they fell from nearly 325 per 100,000
residents in 1971 to around 50 per 100,000 residents in 1996), and his
results suggest that deinstitutionalization was responsible for between
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 3, at 127.
44 GARLAND, supra note 30, at 111.
45 Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California's
Two- and Three-Strike Legislation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 159-60 (2002).
46 See, e.g., MARC MAUER, THE RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999).
47 Governor George Pataki of New York, for example, appointed several conservatives to
long terms on the state parole board in the waning days of his last term. Sam Roberts, Pataki
Creates Legacy, Filling Scores of Posts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at Al. Thus even
though Pataki was succeeded shortly thereafter by a Democrat, Eliot Spitzer, the effects of
his conservative views linger.
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48,000 to 148,000 of the prisoners incarcerated in 1996, or between 4.5%
and 14% of the total prison population.48
Two recent articles by Bernard Harcourt have demonstrated even more
starkly the importance of deinstitutionalization. 49  Harcourt argues that
focusing solely on prison as a form of incapacitation is incomplete: mental
hospitals incapacitate as well and should therefore be included in any
analysis of incapacitation's effect on crime. He shows that if we define
"total commitments" as the sum of hospital confinements and prison
populations, the U.S. has only just recently returned to the levels of per
capita incapacitation that it experienced in the 1950s.50 That some of the
resurgence in confinement is likely due to substituting imprisonment for
hospitalization indicates the need to account for deinstitutionalization.
A second important factor is prison capacity. Some researchers have
suggested that not only are new prisons built in anticipation of greater
prison populations, but that defendants are more likely to be incarcerated
the more cell space is available: capacity can induce incarceration.5 1 The
central idea is that, on the margin, a judge is more willing to incarcerate-
and to do so more severely-the more space he thinks is available. Such a
theory assumes that judges are aware of prison capacity in their
jurisdictions and that they have the discretion to adjust their sentencing
accordingly. The first seems reasonable, since judges certainly have
contacts with various relevant actors in the criminal justice system. The
second depends on a state's sentencing regime.
The third factor is related to capacity, namely federal court orders
imposing population caps and other restrictions in response to severe
overcrowding. The 1965 case of Talley v. Stephens52 marked the first foray
by a federal court into state prison oversight. Ultimately forty-seven states
48 Steven Raphael, The Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill and Growth in the U.S.
Prison Populations: 1971 to 1996 11-12, 14 (Sept. 2000), available at http://socrates.
berkeley.edu/-raphael/raphael2000.pdf (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Raphael,
Deinstitutionalization].
49 Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration
Revolution, 84 TEX. L. REv. 1751 (2006); Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the
Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration Revolution-Part II: State Level Analysis (Univ. of
Chicago, John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 335, Mar. 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 970341.
50 To some extent, then, what stands out is not the boom from the 1970s to the 2000s, but
the precipitous decline in total commitments in the 1950s and 1960s.
51 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS:
POPULATION TRENDS AND PREDICTIONS (1980); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 3.
52 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (temporarily enjoining the use of corporal
punishment on inmates, enjoining prison authorities from denying inmates access to courts,
and enjoining prison authorities from retaliating against those inmates who file legal
complaints).
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and the District of Columbia have found their prison systems subject to
judicial orders, all but seven to a significant degree. Most important for the
question here, approximately twelve states have had their entire prison
systems-rather than particular facilities--declared unconstitutional due (at
least) to overcrowding and, as a result, have been subject to extensive
federal judicial regulation; the subsequent population caps slowed
population growth in those states.53 It is thus important to properly control
for such restrictions on prison growth.
The final important factor is the general financial and budgetary health
of the state in question. Constructing and maintaining prisons is a costly
endeavor, so wealthier states are in a better position to expand and maintain
capacity. On the margin states are more likely to invest in the criminal
justice system the better their economies and the more tax revenues they
collect. Two recent studies by the Vera Institute of Justice indicate that
states have recently begun looking for ways to slow, if not reverse, the
growth of prisons in light of tighter post-2001 budgets.54 In 2002, for
example, twenty-five states cut expenditures on corrections; only higher
education spending was cut in more (twenty-nine).55 This is consistent with
a positive relationship between a state's economic health and its
incarceration rate.
The theories discussed above all set forth credible claims about the
forces influencing prison population growth rates. But theory alone cannot
determine the absolute or relative importance of these factors. For that,
empirical analysis is required, to which I now turn.
53 There is some disagreement here. Relying on data from the ACLU, Steven Levitt
identifies twelve such states: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Mississippi,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. Steven D.
Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison
Overcrowding Legislation, 111 Q.J. ECON. 319, 326 (1996). Margo Schlanger, however,
using data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics' Census of State and Federal Correctional
Facilities, lists fifteen states as being subject to system-wide court orders in 1995; while she
does not include Arkansas, Florida, Oklahoma, and Tennessee, she does include the District
of Columbia, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, South Dakota,
and Utah. Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and
Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 550, 577 (2006). Reconciling these claims is an
important future project, especially since, as Levitt demonstrates, system-wide court orders
provide an effective device for breaking the endogenous relationship between incarceration
and crime. See Pfaff, Prison Population Growth, supra note 1.
54 ROBIN CAMPBELL, DOLLARS & SENTENCES: LEGISLATORS' VIEWS ON PRISONS,
PUNISHMENT, AND THE BUDGET CRISIS (2003); DANIEL WILHELM & NICHOLAS TURNER,
ISSUES IN BRIEF: Is THE BUDGET CRISIS CHANGING THE WAY WE LOOK AT SENTENCING AND
INCARCERATION? (2002).
55 WILHELM & TURNER, supra note 54, at 2.
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III. FINDINGS OF CURRENT STUDIES
In 1991, Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins lamented the lack of
empirical research on the scale of incarceration. They noted that only two
theories-Rusche and Kirchheimer's unemployment claim and Blumstein's
Weberian "homeostatic" hypothesis-had been tested, and both had (to
them) come up short.56 Since Zimring and Hawkins's complaint, however,
the continued growth in the U.S. prison population has encouraged many
researchers to explore empirically the causes of the boom.
A. THE PRIMARY STUDIES
Over the past twenty-five years, many investigators have attempted to
empirically validate at least some, if not most, of the theories set forth
above. In particular, an examination of every empirical article on prison
growth published in fifty-nine journals 57 in criminology, economics, law,
political science, and sociology between January 1990 and May 2006
turned up twenty major studies. 58 Table 1 lists the journals considered.
56 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 3, at ch. 1. That Rusche and Kirchheimer's neo-
Marxist approach lacks strong empirical support does not mean unemployment has no effect
on prison populations, just that it is not the sole, or perhaps even the primary, engine.
57 I did not limit my search to the fifty-nine journals listed in Table 1. I also looked at
the bibliography of each potentially relevant article from those journals for other viable
studies, and did the same for any such studies that I thus came across. Some of the twenty
articles therefore do not come from the fifty-nine primary journals.
58 The twenty studies are: Thomas M. Arvanites, Increasing Imprisonment: A Function
of Crime or Socio-Economic Factors?, 17 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 19 (1992); Thomas M.
Arvanites & Martin A. Asher, State and County Incarceration Rates: The Direct and
Indirect Effects of Race and Inequality, 57 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIOL. 207 (1998); Thomas M.
Arvanites & Martin A. Asher, The Direct and Indirect Effects of Socio-Economic Variables
on State Imprisonment Rates, 7 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REv. 27 (1995); Katherine Beckett &
Bruce Western, Governing Social Marginality: Welfare, Incarceration, and the
Transformation of State Policy, 3 PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 43 (2001); David F. Greenberg &
Valerie West, State Prison Populations and Their Growth 1971-1991, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 615
(2001); David Jacobs & Jason T. Carmichael, The Politics of Punishment Across Time and
Space: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis of Imprisonment Rates, 80 SOCIAL FORCES 61 (2001);
David Jacobs & Ronald Helms, Towards a Political Model of Incarceration: A Time-Series
Examination of Multiple Explanations for Prison Admission Rates, 102 AM. J. Soc. 323
(1996) [hereinafter Jacobs & Helms, Political Model]; David Jacobs & Ronald Helms,
Towards a Political Sociology of Punishment: Politics and Changes in the Incarcerated
Population, 30 Soc. ScI. RES. 171 (2001) [hereinafter Jacobs & Helms, Political Sociology];
Gloria T. Lessan, Macro-Economic Determinants of Penal Policy: Estimating the
Unemployment and Inflation Influences on Imprisonment Rate Changes in the United States,
1948-1985, 16 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 177 (1991); Yair Listokin, Does More Crime
Mean More Prisoners? An Instrumental Variables Approach, 46 J.L. & ECON. 181 (2003);
Thomas B. Marvell, Sentencing Guidelines and Prison Population Growth, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 696 (1995); Marvell & Moody, Age-Structure Trends, supra note 21; Thomas
B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Determinate Sentencing and Abolishing Parole: The Long-
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Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide a summary of the findings from these studies;
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 distill the essential features of Tables 2.1 and 2.2,
respectively. To be included in note 58, a study had to satisfy three
conditions: it had to focus on state-level data, be written after 1990 (once
the upward trend was sufficiently established), and control for at least
several of the posited theories simultaneously.5 9 These criteria exclude at
least two types of studies, namely those looking at offender-level data and
those solely decomposing growth into its constituent parts (changes in
crime, in arrests per crime, in prosecution per arrest, and so on). Parts III.B
and III.C, respectively, briefly discuss these methods.
Term Impacts on Prisons and Crime, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 107 (1996) [hereinafter Marvell &
Moody, Determinate Sentencing]; Raymond J. Michalowski & Michael A. Pearson,
Punishment and Social Structure at the State Level: A Cross-Sectional Comparison of 1970
and 1980, 27 J. RES. CRIME. & DELNQ. 52 (1990); Sean Nicholson-Crotty, The Impact of
Sentencing Guidelines on State-Level Sanctions: An Analysis over Time, 50 CRIME &
DELINQ. 395 (2004); Raphael, Deinstitutionalization, supra note 48; Kevin B. Smith, The
Politics of Punishment: Evaluating Political Explanations of Incarceration Rates, 66 J.
POLITICS 925 (2004); Jon Sorensen & Don Stemen, The Effect of State Sentencing Policies
on Incarceration Rates, 48 CRIME & DELINQ. 456 (2002); Thomas D. Stucky, Karen Heimer
& Joseph B. Lang, Partisan Politics, Electoral Competition and Imprisonment: An Analysis
of States over Time, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 211 (2005); and William A. Taggart & Russell G.
Winn, Imprisonment in the American States, 74 Soc. ScI. Q. 736 (1993).
59 With the exception of those by Marvell, Moody, and Listokin, the articles considered
here not only control for several theories at once but seek to test and measure multiple causal
theories simultaneously. As I discuss in Part IV.B, multiple controls are essential, but each
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Table 2.1
Studies Examining Prison Population/Incarceration Rates
Taggart
Michalowski & Arvanites
& Pearson Lessan0' )  Arvanites Winn & Asher
Study Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1995
Dependent Variable Rate Rate Rate 37 Rate Rate
No. of States in Sample 50 NTS 51 48 49/51
Years 70, 80(a) 48-85 80, 88(a) 84 90
Specifications 1/year 2 2/year 1 6
( )
Variables
Crime (e) + -





































Studies Examining Prison Population/Incarceration Rates
Taggart
Michalowski & Arvanites
& Pearson Lessan Arvanites Winn & Asher
Study Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1995
Variables
" Pop., 14-24 ..... .... ... ......
% Pop., 18-29 +
% Pop., 25-34
% P op .,_35-4 5 _ .................. ... .... ....
% Male, 14-25
% Black ...
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Studies Examining Prison Population/Incarceration Rates
Taggart
Michalowski & Arvanites
& Pearson Lessan Arvanites Winn & Asher












Endogeneity Control No Yes No No No
Serial Correl. Control 0 Yes a a E
Heterosked. Control Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk
Diff-in-Diff Control _ M 1 0 1
Note: The titles of the studies are provided in note 58. "Rate" means the article used the
incarceration rate as its dependent variable, "NTS" stands for national-level time series
rather than a panel of states, and "specifications" provides the number of models
estimated in a given article. A coefficient that is positive and significant in all
specifications is indicated by "+I+" (and "- - -" if negative and significant in all); if
positive in all specifications and significant in at least half, "++" (and likewise " if
negative); if positive in all specifications but significant in fewer than half, by "+" (and
... for negative). If the sign is inconsistent across specifications, the coefficient is
labeled "NR" (for "Not Robust"). "Endogeneity Control" indicates whether the article
controlled for the endogenous relationship between prison populations and crime, "Serial
Correl. Control" whether the article explicitly corrected for serial correlation,
"Heterosked. Control" whether it explicitly addressed issues of heteroskedasticity, and
"Diff-in-Diff Control" whether it accounted for the serial correlation problems raised by
difference-in-difference estimators discussed in Bertrand et al., infra note 95. ""
indicates that the issue was immaterial for that paper, and "Unk" means that it is unclear
from the article if the regressions control for the particular issue. (a) Each year is tested
separately. (b) For Lessan, all variables except inflation are differences, not levels. (c)
One specification looks at white unemployment, the other black. (d) Rate is with respect
to population between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five, not population as a whole. (e)
Terms are each used in separate regressions. (f) Scale not properly defined, meaning it is
not possible to know implications of a positive or negative effect. (g) Two variations are




Studies Examining Prison Population/Incarceration Rates
Marvell Marvell Arvanites
& & &
Marvell Moody Moody Asher Raphael
Study Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000
Dependent Variable Ln(Rate) Ln(Rate) Ln(Rate) Rate Rate
No. of States in Sample 9 50 50 45/51 51
Years 76-93 72-93 71-94 93 71-96
Specifications 1 1 1 1/yr 3
Variables
Crime ++(e)




Probation Rate- 1 1 --..... . .... ..  .. ....... .......... ....................... , .. .......................... ..... , ...... ......... ... .... ...... ....... ,..... .. .... .............. . ..... -- -- -...... . . .. .. . . . -- --- -.. . .. . .. . . ....
L Admits from
Cond'l Releaseh n g- n -- - p.. .  .. .. . .. -  - .......... .... ... .... .. .. . . . . . . ... . ........ .. . . ... . . ... . .














Unemployment . . . . . ... t n m o m e t .. . . . . .. .... ..... ............................ ..... .     .................... ..... . ............. ...... . . .... .... 
, Employment - - +
Poverty + + NR





. .............. .................................. ......... ................ . .................. . .. .......... .............................. .. ............ ........... ...... ...............................   ................. ......................
Gini Coefficient NR
Out-of-Wedlock
.fi " Births .. . . . . ... .
Divorce Rate
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Studies Examining Prison Population/Incarceration Rates
Marvell Marvell Arvanites
° & & &
Marvell Moody Moody Asher Raphael
Study Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000
Variables
%, P.op.,. 14-24 +0 -.. . .
% Pop., 18-29
% Pop., 25-34 ++ ++ + NR






































Studies Examining Prison Population/Incarceration Rates
Marvell Marvell Arvanites
&. & &
Marvell Moody Moody Asher Raphael













_Endogeneity Control Yes Yes Yes No No
Serial Correl. Control Yes Yes Yes * Yes
Heterosked. Control Yes Yes Yes Unk Yes
Diff-in-Diff Control No No E* No
Note: The titles of the studies are provided in note 58. "Rate" means the article used the
incarceration rate as its dependent variable, "NTS" stands for national-level time series
rather than a panel of states, and "specifications" provides the number of models
estimated in a given article. A coefficient that is positive and significant in all
specifications is indicated by "+++" (and "- - " if negative and significant in all); if
positive in all specifications and significant in at least half, "++" (and likewise .- " if
negative); if positive in all specifications but significant in fewer than half, by "+" (and
... for negative). If the sign is inconsistent across specifications, the coefficient is
labeled "NR" (for "Not Robust"). "Endogeneity Control" indicates whether the article
controlled for the endogenous relationship between prison populations and crime, "Serial
Correl. Control" whether the article explicitly corrected for serial correlation,
"Heterosked. Control" whether it explicitly addressed issues of heteroskedasticity, and
"Diff-in-Diff Control" whether it accounted for the serial correlation problems raised by
difference-in-difference estimators discussed in Bertrand et al., infra note 95. "0"
indicates that the issue was immaterial for that paper, and "Unk" means that it is unclear
from the article if the regressions control for the particular issue. (e) Terms are each used
in separate regressions. (h) Effect depends on type of guidelines adopted. (i) Age here is
18-24, not 18-29. (j) Ages are < 15 (++), 15-17 (--), and 18-24 (++).
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Studies Examining Prison Population/Incarceration Rates
Beckett Beckett Greenberg Greenberg Jacobs
& & & & &
Western Western West West Helms
Study Year 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001
Dependent Variable Rate Rate Rate Change DD(Rate)
(n)
No. of States in Sample 44 44 49 49 NTS
Years 75,85,95 75,85,95 71,81,91 71,81,91 53-98
Specifications 4 4 3 2 9(0)
Variables
Crime ++
Violent Crime ++ NR ++
Property Crime - NR 
++ +




























Gini Coefficient NR NR ++
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Southern State NR )  - - -
W elfare Spending .........- - - -............... . ..... .............
Educ'n Spending
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State Econ.
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Studies Examining Prison Population/Incarceration Rates
Beckett Beckett Greenberg Greenberg Jacobs
& & & & &
Western Western West West Helms













Court Order - +
Endogeneity Control No No No No No........... - ~  ......... N °.1,1'  . ........ 0.. . ..... .  ......... .........  .N  11111 .... N O.............Serial Correl. Control No No Yes Yes Yes
Heterosked. Control Unk Unk Yes Yes Yes
Diff-in-Diff Control * No No _
Note: The titles of the studies are provided in note 58. "Rate" means the article used the
incarceration rate as its dependent variable, "NTS" stands for national-level time series
rather than a panel of states, and "specifications" provides the number of models
estimated in a given article. A coefficient that is positive and significant in all
specifications is indicated by "+++" (and "- - -" if negative and significant in all); if
positive in all specifications and significant in at least half, "++" (and likewise " if
negative); if positive in all specifications but significant in fewer than half, by "+" (and
... for negative). If the sign is inconsistent across specifications, the coefficient is
labeled "NR" (for "Not Robust"). "Endogeneity Control" indicates whether the article
controlled for the endogenous relationship between prison populations and crime, "Serial
Correl. Control" whether the article explicitly corrected for serial correlation,
"Heterosked. Control" whether it explicitly addressed issues of heteroskedasticity, and
"Diff-in-Diff Control" whether it accounted for the serial correlation problems raised by
difference-in-difference estimators discussed in Bertrand et al., infra note 95. "0"
indicates that the issue was immaterial for that paper, and "Unk" means that it is unclear
from the article if the regressions control for the particular issue. (k) The variable is
(%black)/ 3. (1) The change in sign arises only in the equation interacting the particular
variable with year dummies; the base value changes sign, but the interaction terms are
generally of the same sign as the other specifications and larger than the base value. (in)
The change in state revenue (as opposed to its level effect) is consistently positive and
significant. (n) "DD" stands for second-difference. "Ln(AveRt)" means the natural log
of the average incarceration rate across two years (1971-1972, 1981-1982, and 1991-
1992). (o) All specifications include measures of Republican presidencies, Gini




Studies Examining Prison Population/Incarceration Rates
Jacobs Sorensen
& & Nicholson-
Carmichael Stemen Cro Smith
Study Year 2001 2002 2004 2004
Dependent Variable Ln(AveRt) Rate Rate Rate
No. of States in Sample 50 50 50 49
Years 71,81,91 96 75-98 80-95
Specifications 8_)  1 1 1
Variables
Crime ++ +
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Studies Examining Prison Population/Incarceration Rates
Jacobs Sorensen
& & Nicholson-
Carmichael Stemen Crotty Smith
Study Year 2001 2002 2004 2004
Variables
% Pop., 14-24 +(S)
% Pop., 18-29
% Pop., 25-34 ..
% Pop., 35-45
% Male, 14-25
P. % Black ++ ++ ++ ++
% Young Black Maleo
E % Latino +































Studies Examining Prison Population/Incarceration Rates
Jacobs Sorensen
& & Nicholson-
Carmichael Stemen Crotty Smith










Three Strike Laws .... .... +
Court Order
Endogeneity Control No No No No
Serial Correl. Control Yes 0 Yes Yes
Heterosked. Control Yes Unk Yes Yes
Diff-in-Diff Control No M No No
Note: The titles of the studies are provided in note 58. "Rate" means the article used the
incarceration rate as its dependent variable, "NTS" stands for national-level time series
rather than a panel of states, and "specifications" provides the number of models
estimated in a given article. A coefficient that is positive and significant in all
specifications is indicated by "+++" (and "- - -" if negative and significant in all); if
positive in all specifications and significant in at least half, "++" (and likewise .... " if
negative); if positive in all specifications but significant in fewer than half, by "+" (and
... for negative). If the sign is inconsistent across specifications, the coefficient is
labeled "NR" (for "Not Robust"). "Endogeneity Control" indicates whether the article
controlled for the endogenous relationship between prison populations and crime, "Serial
Correl. Control" whether the article explicitly corrected for serial correlation,
"Heterosked. Control" whether it explicitly addressed issues of heteroskedasticity, and
"Diff-in-Diff Control" whether it accounted for the serial correlation problems raised by
difference-in-difference estimators discussed in Bertrand et al., infra note 95. ""
indicates that the issue was immaterial for that paper, and "Unk" means that it is unclear
from the article if the regressions control for the particular issue. (p) Four include
extensive time interactions. (q) Variable defined as percent of legislature that is
Republican times a dummy which equals 1 if governor is also Republican. (r) Actual
coefficient in paper is negative since variable measures liberalism of population. (s)
Range is 18-24. not 14-24.
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Table 2.2
Studies Examining Prison Population/Prison Admission
Jacobs Marvell Marvell
& & &
Marvell Helms Moody Moody
Study Year 1995 1996 1996 1997
Dependent Variable Ln(Rate) Rate Ln(Rate) Ln(Rate)
No. of States in Sample 9 NTS 47 47
Years 74-93 50-90 74-93 74-94
Specifications 1 8 1 1
Variables
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Studies Examining Prison Population/Prison Admission
Jacobs Marvell Marvell
& & &
Marvell Helms Moody Moody
Study Year 1995 1996 1996 1997
Variables
% Pop., 14-24 -(e) -(e) +(e)
% Pop., 18-29 .
% Pop., 25-34 ++ ++ +
% Pop., 34-45 .............
.q % Male, 14-25
% Black ++
b % Young Black Male
E % Latino
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Table 2.2 (continued)
Studies Examining Prison Population/Prison Admission
Jacobs Marvell Marvell
& & &
Marvell Helms Moody Moody












Endogeneity Control No No No Yes
Serial Correl. Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Heterosked. Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Diff-in-Diff Control No No N
Note: The titles of the studies are provided in note 58. "Rate" means the article used the
incarceration rate as its dependent variable, "NTS" stands for national-level time series
rather than a panel of states, and "specifications" provides the number of models
estimated in a given article. A coefficient that is positive and significant in all
specifications is indicated by "+++" (and "-. -" if negative and significant in all); if
positive in all specifications and significant in at least half, "++" (and likewise .- " if
negative); if positive in all specifications but significant in fewer than half, by "+" (and
... for negative). If the sign is inconsistent across specifications, the coefficient is
labeled "NR" (for "Not Robust"). "Endogeneity Control" indicates whether the article
controlled for the endogenous relationship between prison populations and crime, "Serial
Correl. Control" whether the article explicitly corrected for serial correlation,
"Heterosked. Control" whether it explicitly addressed issues of heteroskedasticity, and
"Diff-in-Diff Control" whether it accounted for the serial correlation problems raised by
difference-in-difference estimators discussed in Bertrand et al., infra note 95. ""
indicates that the issue was immaterial for that paper, and "Unk" means that it is unclear
from the article if the regressions control for the particular issue. (a) Effect depends on
type of guidelines adopted. (b) Includes each part of stepwise regression method used.




Studies Examining Prison Population/Prison Admission
Sorensen
& Nicholson-
Stemen Listokin Crott Stuc et al.
Study Year 2002 2003 2004 2005
Dependent Variable Rate Ln(Rate) Rate Log-odds t
No. of States in Sample 50 48 50 49
Years 96 85-97 75-98 78-96
Specifications 1 1 1 2
Variables
Crime ++ + +
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Table 2.2 (continued)
Studies Examining Prison Population/Prison Admission
Sorensen
& Nicholson- Stucky et
Stemen Listokin Crotty al.
Study Year 2002 2003 2004 2005
Variables
% Pop., 14-24 + -(g)
% P . , 1 8 -2 9 .......... ...................... ...........................................................     ........
% Pop., 25-34 ++
... .. ... . ........ ........... P o p .,.34 5 
. % Male, 14-25
. % Black ++ ++
to % Young Black Male..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E % Latino +





















.. ...' ...Sn n ..... ..... ... ... . ....... ........   .......... - ... ........ ... ........ ...... . . .. .........-.............. 
EdAuc.'n. Spending ......-..............









Studies Examining Prison Population/Prison Admission
Sorensen
& Nicholson-
Stemen Listokin Crotty Stucky et al.












Endogeneity Control No Yes No No
Serial Correl. Control M Yes Yes Unk
Heterosked. Control No Yes Yes Unk
Diff-in-Diff Control M Yes No _
Note: The titles of the studies are provided in note 58. "Rate" means the article used the
incarceration rate as its dependent variable, "NTS" stands for national-level time series
rather than a panel of states, and "specifications" provides the number of models
estimated in a given article. A coefficient that is positive and significant in all
specifications is indicated by "+++" (and "- -. " if negative and significant in all); if
positive in all specifications and significant in at least half, "++" (and likewise "- -" if
negative); if positive in all specifications but significant in fewer than half, by "+" (and
... for negative). If the sign is inconsistent across specifications, the coefficient is
labeled "NR" (for "Not Robust"). "Endogeneity Control" indicates whether the article
controlled for the endogenous relationship between prison populations and crime, "Serial
Correl. Control" whether the article explicitly corrected for serial correlation,
"Heterosked. Control" whether it explicitly addressed issues of heteroskedasticity, and
"Diff-in-Diff Control" whether it accounted for the serial correlation problems raised by
difference-in-difference estimators discussed in Bertrand et al., infra note 95. "0"
indicates that the issue was immaterial for that paper, and "Unk" means that it is unclear
from the article if the regressions control for the particular issue. (d) Actual coefficient in
paper is of the opposite sign since variable measures liberalism of population. (e) Age
here is 18-24, not 14-24. (f) The dependent variable is the log of the admissions rate
divided by one-minus-the-rate. (g) Stucky et al. use the marriage rate, not the divorce
rate, and find a positive effect. (h) Contestedness measures the number of legislative
seats that face meaningful competition.
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Table 3.1
Inclusion of General Theories in Incarceration Rate Models
Study M&PI L Arv. T&W A&A M



























Structured Sent'g 0 0
Court Orders
Note: The articles are listed here in the same order as in Table 2.1. A bullet (0) indicates




Inclusion of General Theories in Incarceration Rate Models
Study M&M M&M A&A R B&WJ G&W



























Structured Sent'g 0 0
Court Orders 0
Note: The articles are listed here in the same order as in Table 2.1. A bullet (o) indicates
that the article uses some variable to capture the general theory listed for that row.
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Inclusion of General Theories in Incarceration Rate Models
Study I J&H J&C S&S N-C 7 S
























State Spending S 0
Other S
Legal Factors
Structured Sent'g 0 0 0 0
Court Orders
Note: The articles are listed here in the same order as in Table 2.1. A bullet (o) indicates
that the article uses some variable to capture the general theory listed for that row.
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Table 3.2
Inclusion of General Theories in Admissions Models
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Table 3.2 (continued)
Inclusion of General Theories in Admissions Models
Study S&S L N-C S et al.





























The claims summarized in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 must be viewed as
preliminary. Admittedly, a fair degree of consensus exists across the
studies for several factors. Most articles, for example, find that prison
population and admission rates rise with crime rates, and likewise with the
fraction of the population that is young and that is black. But many of the
studies suffer from methodological errors that make identification difficult.
Almost all, for example, fail to properly control for endogenous
relationships between several variables. And despite a handful of consistent
findings, the effects of most variables differ widely across models, even
within particular articles. This instability may be the result of omitted
variable bias, or it may arise from deeper structural concerns with the
regressions. Furthermore, there are conceptual problems with the choice of
variables, such as failing to properly address the complicated intertemporal
JOHN F. PFAFF
dynamics of total prison population. And finally, all the studies essentially
rely on the same set of data: rather than testing the models against alternate
sources of information, all use the same basic set of observations.
This Part provides a summary of the findings from the studies listed in
note 58, along with brief comments on the particular empirical concerns
they raise. Rather than looking at each study in isolation, I will look at
what the studies as a whole imply about each major theory, as well as how
well-identified any effects appear to be. Part III then addresses how, in
general, to rectify the concerns discussed here (as well as other
shortcomings).
1. Prison and Crime Rates
With the exception only of the articles by Marvell and Moody, 60 every
study in note 58 includes a measure of crime rates, and by and large each
finds crime positively correlated with both prison populations and
admissions. Because of several conceptual and methodological limitations,
however, these results do not necessarily identify the actual magnitudes of
the relationships.
The most important conceptual issue implicates the fourteen studies
that examine the relationship between crime and total prison population (as
opposed to admissions). 61 The total stock of prisoners is the product of
complex dynamics. Total prison population rates in 1995 are driven by
crimes rates not just in 1995, but in 1994, 1993, and even 1985. More
crime in 1985 leads to more prisoners admitted to prison in 1985 (and in
1987, since the criminal justice system moves slowly), and thus to more
prisoners still serving time in 1995. The more 1985 suffers from severe
crimes with long attendant sentences, the more important this lagged effect
will be, since a greater fraction of those admitted in 1985 will still be
serving their sentences in 1995. Yet none of the models above includes
60 To avoid including too many footnotes, which can distract from the flow of the
argument, I will not provide specific cites below for the articles listed supra note 58 unless
absolutely necessary to avoid confusion. The specific empirical results mentioned below can
be found in the following locations: Beckett & Western at 50-55 and Tables 1-3; Greenberg
& West at 629-38 and Tables 2-3; Jacobs & Carmichael at 70-75 and Tables 1-3; Jacobs &
Helms, Political Model, at 333-42 and Tables 2-4; Jacobs & Helms, Political Sociology, at
178-88 and Tables 2-3; Lessan at 184-87 and Table 2; Listokin at 189-97 and Tables 1-2 and
5; Marvell at 700-04 and Table 1; Marvell & Moody, Determinate Sentencing, at 113-18 and
Table 3; Marvell & Moody, Age-Structure Trends, at 119-22 and Table 4; Nicholson-Crotty
at 402-05 and Table 2; Raphael at 6-10 and Tables 1-2; Sorensen & Stemen at 461-63 and
Tables 1-2; Smith at 929-32 and Table 1; and Stucky et al. at 220-25 and Tables 1-2.
61 These are all the studies listed in Table 2.1, with the exception of those by Marvell and
Moody.
[Vol. 98
EMPIRICS OF PRISON GRO WTH
more than a single year's crime rate. That lone coefficient does not lend
itself to easy interpretation.
The six models focusing on admission rates that consider crime suffer
much less from this problem.62 Prison admissions in 1995 are not
significantly influenced by crime rates in 1993, much less 1985; the more
sophisticated models address those lags that persist.63  But with one
exception, these models still suffer from an important empirical
shortcoming: they fail to control for the endogenous relationship between
prison admission rates and crime rates. (This problem affects the studies
looking at total population rates as well.64) While crime rates influence
prison admissions, prison admissions likewise affect crime rates. Failure to
control for this simultaneity biases the coefficients in the models, causing
them to understate any true effect.
Yair Listokin's article-the only one to control for endogeneity
effectively-provides a sense of the magnitude of this problem. 65 Listokin
takes advantage of the discovery by John Donohue and Steven Levitt that
abortion rates in the 1970s influenced crime rates in the 1990s, allowing
him to use abortion as an instrumental variable.66 His own results suggest
that this correction nearly doubles the magnitude of crime's effect on prison
62 Table 2.2 lists these articles. Note that Marvell & Moody, Age-Structure Trends,
supra note 21, omit crime, although their other articles include it in their admissions
regressions.
63 Listokin, for example, does not use the crime rate of a single year, but rather a moving
average of two years' crime rates, to reflect the fact that crimes do not lead immediately to
admissions.
64 The exceptions again are those articles by Marvell alone and Marvell & Moody, which
omit the crime variable from their regressions explicitly to avoid simultaneity bias.
However, as a result they trade simultaneity bias for omitted variable bias. See infra Part
IV.A.
65 Listokin uses abortion as an instrument for crime. Lessan, like Listokin, uses an
instrumental variable, but her choice of instrument is unconvincing. She relies on "a
measure of change in the ratio of deflated state correctional expenditures per reported violent
crime." Lessan, supra note 58, at 185. She does not explain how she chose this instrument
or why in theory it should be uncorrelated with prison populations; that her analysis suggests
violent crime rates are unresponsive to prison populations and changes in prison populations
fall as changes in violent crime rates rise caution that her specification may be problematic.
66 John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime,
116 Q.J. ECON. 379 (2001) [hereinafter Donohue & Levitt, Legalized Abortion]. Some have
taken exception to the magnitude of the effect found by Donohue and Levitt. See, e.g., Ted
Joyce, Did Legalized Abortion Lower Crime?, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1 (2004). But even if
these critiques are valid-and Donohue and Levitt argue they are not-the instrumental
relationship survives. See John J. Donohue Ill & Steven D. Levitt, Further Evidence that
Legalized Abortion Lowered Crime: A Reply to Joyce, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 29 (2004).
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admissions.67 Compared to the results from Marvell and Moody, the only
other articles besides Listokin's reporting elasticities, his correction
quadruples the effect of crime (from approximately 0.26 to 1.07). Though
Nicholson-Crotty and Sorensen and Stemen measure absolute effects, not
elasticities, their results-when roughly translated into elasticities-are
between one-third (for Nicholson-Crotty) and two-thirds (for Sorensen and
Stemen) smaller than Listokin's corrected values.68
The findings on crime, then, can be briefly summarized. It appears
that crime rates influence admission rates, although all results but Listokin's
systematically underestimate the size of the effect; Listokin finds that a 1%
increase in crime leads to an approximate 1% increase in admissions,
although the effect is not statistically significant. That crime rates
positively affect admission rates suggests that they should also positively
affect overall incarceration rates, and the positive coefficients returned in
almost every model are consistent with this. 69  But the total-population
models as currently designed are incapable of estimating bounds on the
magnitude of this effect. Even setting aside the problem of endogeneity,
the dynamic relationship between crime and total incarceration is complex
and, in all the models above, ignored.70
2. Prison and Economics
Examinations of the importance of economic conditions-in particular
employment, income levels, and income inequality-produce less
consistent results than those looking at crime. Coefficients vary widely
(even with respect to sign) not just across articles, but across specifications
within articles. Consider the effect of the percent unemployed. In the total-
population regressions, estimates range from approximately -11.5 to +6.5;
67 In the uncorrected regressions, he finds an elasticity of 0.59 (i.e., a 1% increase in
crime leads to a 0.59% increase in prison populations); with the corrections, this elasticity
rises to 1.07.
68 Relying on Listokin's summary statistics, which report a mean admissions rate of 141
per 100,000 and a mean crime rate of 1880 per 100,000, Sorensen and Stemen's coefficient
of 0.024 translates into an elasticity of approximately 0.35 at the means; Nicholson-Crotty's
0.05, an elasticity of 0.67.
69 The only negative coefficients are for property crime when violent and property crimes
are separated.
70 Listokin looks briefly at the issue, regressing crime rates on releases as well as
admissions. But this simply tells us how today's crime rates influence today's releases, not
how patterns of offending two, three, or ten years ago affect releases today. In other words,
as Listokin notes, such a regression measures only any crowd-out effect of today's crime
rates on today's prison population. Listokin, supra note 58, at 200. Data from the National
Corrections Reporting Program, which allows investigators to directly calculate the time
served by individual offenders, provides a way to measure changes in release patterns more
directly. See Pfaff, Trends in Prison Release, supra note 1.
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in the admissions regressions, from approximately -0.7 to +13.27.71 The
sensitivity of these findings to small changes in model structure can be seen
clearly in the article by Beckett and Western: adding year dummies and
terms interacting the year dummies with welfare spending and percent-
minority cause the coefficient on unemployment to swing from
approximately -9 and fairly significant to almost +3 and significant.
Marvell, Moody, and Raphael are the only authors to consider
employment rather than unemployment. The results here are unclear as
well. Marvell and Moody consistently find that employment is (perhaps
surprisingly) positively correlated with prison admissions, but often that it
is negatively correlated with the total prison population. None of the terms,
however, is statistically or numerically significant. Raphael finds slightly
stronger negative relationships between employment and total prison
population.
A potential problem with these results is that there may be an
important, and wholly unacknowledged, source of endogeneity at work.
The U.S. government does not count prisoners as unemployed, so every
unemployed person sent to prison increases the prison population by one
and reduces the unemployment rolls by the same. This endogenous
relationship can be significant. Bruce Western recently demonstrated that
correcting for this endogeneity eliminates the apparent employment gains of
young black men during the 1990s. 72 In the models here, the simultaneity
biases the coefficient downward. If the true relationship is, as theorized,
positive-that rising unemployment drives up prison populations and
admissions-then the reported coefficients will understate the true effect.
This "statistical" endogeneity, however, is not the only type of
endogeneity present. A "causal" form exists as well. Incarceration can
influence unemployment rates, even those adjusted to reflect prison
populations, in two contradictory ways. First, it can (with a lag) reduce the
employment opportunities of those incarcerated; it may even (perhaps
without a lag) reduce the employment options for all young black men,
regardless of whether they have been incarcerated, as a result of statistical
(or direct) discrimination.73  Second, it may increase employment
opportunities for those living where prisons are located. Thus, while the
7 A coefficient of -11.5 implies that a one-percentage-point increase in unemployment
leads to an 11.5-point decline in the incarceration rate (per 100,000). The value of -0.7 is
derived from Listokin, who uses In (admission rate per 1000) as his dependent variable. His
coefficient of -0.005 implies a one-percentage-point change in unemployment leads to a
0.5% decline in the admission rate. At the average admission rate of 141 per 100,000, this
translates into a 0.7-point decline in the admissions rate.




direction of the bias from statistical endogeneity is identifiable, that from
the causal endogeneity is not. If the effect on those incarcerated is stronger
than that on those guarding them, then the bias pushes the coefficient up; if
the effect on those incarcerated is weaker, then the bias pushes the
coefficient down.
Drawing inferences about the magnitude or range of other relevant
economic factors is equally difficult. The results for the effect of poverty,
for example, are inconsistent. In a single study of total population (Beckett
and Western), the coefficient on poverty ranges from approximately -3 to
+7; in the admissions articles, the effect is generally close to zero. Part of
the problem here is likely endemic to the poverty measure: it exhibits little
variation across states, and even less within a particular state over time.
Listokin, the only article to provide relevant summary statistics, reports a
mean poverty rate of 13.4, with an overall standard deviation of 4.03, but a
within-state standard deviation of only 1.8. With little variation and in the
presence of state- and year-fixed effects, it is perhaps not surprising that the
results are weak and inconsistent.
The remaining economic variables are similarly unstable, at least in the
total-population equations. Five models look at personal income, five at
inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, and one at both. The effect of
personal income ranges from -5.9 to +7.9 in Raphael's study alone.
Similarly, Marvell finds a rough absolute effect of +0.0008, 74 Nicholson-
Crotty of -471 (!); Nicholson-Crotty provides no summary statistics, but I
have to believe that he uses a different scale than Raphael or Marvell and
Moody, and that a comparative value would be -4.71.75 Results for the
Gini coefficient exhibit a similar pattern. It should perhaps be expected that
the total-population results are unstable. As noted before, total population
is a function of numerous lags that a single period of, say, unemployment
cannot capture. Total-population regressions are likely highly model
dependent and thus quite sensitive to functional form.76
In the admissions equations, however, the results are more stable.
Putting aside one study, the effects of personal income are consistently
negative, though the magnitude of the effects differs greatly. Listokin, for
74 Moody's results are elasticities. Using a mean personal income of $22,000 (from
Listokin) and a mean prison population rate of 209 (from Raphael), this implies that, at the
means, a $220 (1%) change in income leads to a change of 0.1672 (0.08%) in the
incarceration rate. This translates into an absolute effect at the means of 0.0008.
75 Nicholson-Crotty's results consistently differ from the others by several orders of
magnitude, and it is unclear why this is so. In general, insufficient attention is paid in most
of the articles to the implications of the reported magnitudes.
76 See Daniel Ho et al., Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model
Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference, 155 POL. ANALYSIS 199 (2007); see also infra
Part IV.B.
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example, returns an elasticity of-1.3; both articles by Marvell and Moody,
an elasticity of -0.15. The one exception to the negative results is the
article by Nicholson-Crotty, which provides an absolute effect of +339,
although it is unclear exactly what this means.
77
We thus know only a little about the importance of the economic
theories. The most consistent effect is that of personal income on
admissions: it appears to be negative, though the estimates differ widely.
The impact of unemployment is less stable, but it suffers from potentially
important, and unaddressed, sources of endogeneity. That of poverty is
likewise unstable, but then the variable does not vary much.
3. Prison and Demographics
A few regularities appear among the demographic variables. First,
consider age. The regressions looking at total prison population, with the
exception of those by Raphael, return positive coefficients on the age
variables, with stronger effects for the older groups.78 In general, the results
suggest that a one-percentage-point increase in the share of those between
eighteen and twenty-four increases the incarceration rate by approximately
1 or 2 per 100,000; of those between twenty-five and thirty-four, 4 to 8 per
100,000. 79 Roughly similar patterns obtain in the admissions regressions.
For those between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four, the results
indicate that a one-percentage-point increase raises the admissions rate by
between 5 and 18 per 100,000.80 Some results, however, suggest that the
effect is negative for those under twenty-four. In both the total population
and admission regressions, only the results for those between twenty-five
and thirty-four are consistently statistically significant, and even then not
always.
77 Nicholson-Crotty's results seem to indicate that a one dollar increase in average
personal income raises the admissions rate by 339 per 100,000. Given that, according to
Listokin, the mean admissions rate is 141 per 100,000 and the standard deviation on personal
income is $3652, this cannot be the case. Even a coefficient of 3.39 seems too large.
78 Note that both Marvell and Moody articles omit crime from their regressions looking
at total population (to avoid problems with simultaneity). Given the correlations between
age and crime, it is likely that the age coefficient is picking up some of the crime effect; the
nature of the bias will vary with age group.
79 Again, this is converting the Marvell and Moody elasticities into absolute effects at the
means.
80 The causal mechanism here is unclear. The age of a defendant may directly influence a
judge's willingness to incarcerate him or to do so for longer. But it is also possible that on
average an older defendant has a longer record and thus automatically faces a greater risk of
prison or a greater risk of a longer sentence.
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The results also suggest that prison populations and prison admissions
grow with the percent of the population that is black.81  In the total
population regressions, the results imply that a one-percentage-point
increase in the percent black raises the incarceration rate by around 2.5 to 6
per 100,000.82 Beckett and Western find an effect of +393, but this likely
means a change of 3.93 per 100,000.83  For admissions, the results lie
between 0.6 and 4.2 per 100,000.84 The coefficients in both types of
regressions tend to be statistically significant.
The last demographic term that appears in multiple studies is a control
for urbanization. These results are often neither significant nor robust. In
Beckett and Western, for example, one set of regressions indicates that the
effect of urbanization shifts from a significant -2.78 to an almost-
significant +0.83 just by changing the assumption about the error
distribution (from a normal to a t-distribution). Greenberg and West find
consistently negative but highly insignificant results in the levels
regressions, but in the first-difference regressions the sign flips from
negative to positive (insignificant in both cases) with the addition of a
single, relatively unrelated term (an interaction between narcotics arrests
and a year dummy).
The current studies, then, appear to suggest two things about the effect
of demographics on prison populations: admission and population rates rise
with the percent of the population that is between twenty-four and thirty-
five and with the percent of the population that is black. The magnitude of
the effects on total population appears to be similar, on the order of about 5
per 100,000. For admissions, the effect of age is slightly larger, of race
slightly smaller. Unfortunately, there is little discussion of how much these
variables vary within a state over time, so it is unclear how much these
factors explains trends within, as opposed to across, states.
81 The only study to get a negative effect was Raphael. It is unclear why this is the case.
82 Stucky et al. also find a positive coefficient for race. Their choice of dependent
variable, however, makes it difficult to compare their results-for race or any other
explanatory variable-to those of the other articles discussed here.
83 The incarceration rate appears to change by 393 if the percent black, which must fall
between zero and one, increases by one, not one percentage point. In other words, when the
percent black changes from its mean value of 0.118 to 1.118, the incarceration rate rises by
393 per 100,000 (ignoring extrapolation problems). This is, of course, impossible.
84 The value of 4.2 is derived from the elasticity of 0.36 in Marvell & Moody,
Determinate Sentencing, supra note 58. Nicholson-Crotty reports a coefficient of 64, but as
stated supra note 75, I believe this translates to 0.64 per 100,000.
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4. Prison and Politics
The claim that politics has driven prison growth implicates at least two
separate theories: (1) that a more conservative polity inherently demands
more punishment, and (2) that politicians cynically use crime (or the fear of
crime) as a "wedge" issue to secure votes. The two theories are not wholly
independent-crime works as a wedge issue only if people care about it-
but they do lead to significantly different implications. The first, for
example, suggests that more conservative states should adopt more severe
punishments; the second suggests that legislatures with unstable majorities
should pass harsher laws regardless of political orientation. By and large
the studies considered here have focused only on the first possibility, and
even then it is unclear how well they have identified its effect.
The only factor studied with any regularity is the conservatism of the
electorate. Four of the six studies examining the importance of citizen
ideology use the scale developed by William Berry and his co-authors;
85
two others use less reliable measures.86 The effects are somewhat robust.
For total prison populations, all four studies find that more liberal states
incarcerate less, although the effect is not always statistically significant. In
the admissions regressions, Sorensen and Stemen again find positive effects
for conservatism, but Nicholson-Crotty now finds a negative effect which,
while statistically insignificant, is twice the absolute size of Sorensen and
Stemen's.
The terms are difficult to interpret because the scale does not have any
inherent meaning. The Berry index scores states from 0 to 100, with 100
being the most liberal and 0 the most conservative.8 7  The sample-wide
standard deviation is approximately 16, though intrastate standard
deviations are generally smaller, often less than 10. A coefficient of 0.15,
85 William D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American
States, 1960-93, 42 AM. J. POL. Sci. 327 (1998). The data are available at ICPSR
(http://www.icpsr.umich.edu) and have been updated through 2004. The four studies are
those by Jacobs and Carmichael, Nicholson-Crotty, Smith, and Sorensen and Stemen.
86 Greenberg and West use a scale that is available for a single year, imposing the
assumption that political attitudes in the states changed little between 1970 and 1990; this is
directly contradicted by the end-of-modernity hypothesis. Jacobs and Helms, Political
Model-which relies on national time series data instead of panel data-uses an index of the
percent of governors and members of (only) Congress who are Republican, along with
Gallup Poll responses, to measure conservatism. Unfortunately, they multiply this index by
an indicator for whether the president is Republican, effectively ignoring political shifts
during Democratic presidential regimes. Furthermore, their focus on national political actors
seems inappropriate for an issue that is predominantly a state matter.
87 The results in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide the sign of (1 - index), so that the sign




the results in Nicholson-Crotty, would imply that a one-standard-deviation
increase in conservatism increases a state's incarceration rate by
approximately 0.75 per 100,000 (if sd = 5) to 2.25 per 100,000 (if sd = 15).
No other political variable receives much sustained attention.88 Three
studies of total population, however, consider the importance of the
Republican-ness of the state legislature. The models generally indicate that
states with more-Republican legislatures incarcerate more, but the results
are often small, both numerically and statistically. And two total-
population models attempt to measure the effect of electoral pressures by
looking at presidential election years; one (Jacobs and Helms, Political
Sociology) finds small positive effects, the other (Smith) small negative
effects. The latter model also includes an indicator for gubernatorial
elections, which is positive, suggesting perhaps that what matters more are
state electoral pressures.
Only one article, that by Stucky et al., tests the importance of the
electoral competition theory alongside that of the conservatism theory. It
considers two measures of electoral pressures: a simple one ("contestation")
based on the percent of legislative races that involved at least two
candidates; and a more complex one ("competition") that employs an index
involving the average margin of victory, the number of safe seats (a margin
of victory of at least twenty percentage points), and the number of contested
seats. In general, their results indicate that prison admissions grow with the
Republican-ness of the legislature, that this effect has grown stronger over
time, and that it grows stronger still the more competitive the state's
legislative (but apparently not gubernatorial) politics; these results obtain
for both the "contestation" and "competition" models.
Clearly, we have only begun to explore the importance of political
effects. The focus on state ideology and legislative composition is a
promising start, but it suffers from several shortcomings. The first is that,
with one exception, little effort has been made to separate the conservative
hypothesis from the electioneering hypothesis. The second is closely tied to
the first. Only presidents, governors, and state legislators have been noted
so far, despite the fact that district attorneys, state attorneys general, state
judges, and mayors (all of whom--or, for judges, many of whom-are
elected like legislators and governors) may influence prison growth at least
as much as, if not more than, the three sets of included actors. Mayors may
hire more police in difficult elections, 89 district attorneys may prosecute
88 For the admissions models, no other political variable at all is considered, except for
the effect of presidential election years in one study.
89 Steven Levitt has found evidence that urban police forces rise during election years
regardless of the crime rate, and that gubernatorial and mayoral elections have similar
effects: police forces rise by about 2% in both mayoral and gubernatorial election years.
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more aggressively in election years, and judges up for re-election may be
less sympathetic to criminal defendants. 90 Furthermore, each of these actors
faces a different set of incentives and may be loyal to different segments of
the electorate. 91
One reason for the focus on presidents, governors, and legislators is
surely a matter of data. My own efforts have revealed that while data on
these elections are easily available, those for the other actors mentioned
above are significantly harder to find, especially in a useable form. The
unavailability of such data, however, indicates that more attention must be
given to working around, and to exploring the epistemic implications of,
their absence.
Finally, it should be noted that none of the models addresses Tonry's
theory of cycles in sensibilities. This, however, may not be problematic.
The sensibilities theory focuses on explaining either how crime trends
encourage people to become more receptive to conservative values (if
conservatism's relative toughness towards crime is essentially constant), or
how these trends encourage conservatives to adopt increasingly hard-line
views towards crime (if their toughness is flexible but generally harsher
than liberals'). It thus tries to explain why (and when) we should expect a
positive coefficient on measures of political and social conservatism, but it
does not necessarily suggest different specifications for the empirical
models themselves. In other words, that the models do not explicitly
account for Tonry's claim does not mean, if he is correct, that the models
suffer from an omitted explanatory variable.
Ultimately, then, the current studies have just begun to examine the
importance of the political theories. They provide some indication that
more conservative states tend to incarcerate more people, and that increases
in conservatism are correlated with increases in prison populations. But
they leave unanswered many important questions that future work must
Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on
Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REv. 270, 275 (1997).
90 Jason Czamezki has demonstrated that Wisconsin Supreme Court justices often adopt
noticeably harsher attitudes toward criminal defendants in the year each is up for re-election.
Jason J. Czarnezki, Voting and Electoral Politics in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 87
MARQUETTE L. REv. 323 (2003).
91 Consider New York State. At least in the 1980s, New York City accounted for 72% of
the state's prisoners. Jeffrey A. Fagan, Valerie West & Jan Holland, Reciprocal Effects of
Crime and Incarceration in New York City Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1551,
1568 (2003). But less than half of New York State's legislators came from New York City.
See Who Are Your Elected Officials?, http://nymap.elections.state.ny.us/nysboe/ (last visited
July 1, 2008). Thus, the groups passing the state's criminal laws were elected by a (state)
population that differed systematically from the (city) population that elected those most
responsible for enforcing the laws.
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address.92 For example, they do not explain how increased conservatism
induces higher prison rates: it may lead to a greater focus on enforcement,
longer sentences in the code, harsher prosecutors and thus less favorable
pleas, or increasingly conservative judges, among other possibilities. Nor
in general do the studies test the importance of the electioneering theory.
Moreover, by focusing on the legislature, the governor, or the President, it
is unclear if these models are examining changing patterns in the
institutions most central to the administration of criminal justice.
5. Prisons and Four (or Five) Other Theories
Four other theories have also been advanced to explain prison growth:
mental hospital deinstitutionalization, changes in prison capacity, court
orders reducing (or fixing) effective prison capacity, and overall state fiscal
health. Unfortunately again, the studies in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 do not
address any of these theories in any consistent manner. For example,
despite widespread concern about deinstitutionalization's role in prison
population growth, only Raphael considers it, finding evidence that it is
responsible for approximately 4.5% to 14% of the total prison population in
1996. Similarly, Taggart and Winn's is the only study to include a direct
measure of prison capacity,93 and Greenberg and West's is the only one to
include a variable for court orders restricting prison populations. Neither
finds significant results.
State economic health has received slightly more attention, with four
studies looking at some measure of state revenue, state economic growth, or
per capita gross state product ("GSP") as a proxy for the state's tax base.
The results, though, are weak. Greenberg and West find small but
significant positive effects in their regression in levels, but almost no effect
at all in their regression in first-differences. Beckett and Western produce
numerically small, insignificant, and unstable coefficients on their measure
of fiscal health. Both articles by Jacobs and Helms yield numerically and
statistically insignificant results. That these models fail to identify any
effect, however, does not conclusively indicate its absence. Per capita
92 If, as preliminary efforts at gathering data seem to suggest, not all these theories are
testable, then investigators need to think more carefully about precisely what their models
are in fact describing. A particular coefficient, for example, may be conflating more than
one theory. See Pfaff, Prison Population Growth, supra note 1.
93 Capacity, of course, introduces serious risks of endogeneity as well. Increasing prison
populations may encourage states to expand capacity, but expansions in capacity may
conversely induce greater use of prison. Moreover, accurate measures of capacity are
difficult to come by.
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income and per capita state GSP, for example, are poor proxies for tax
94receipts.
Finally, it should be noted that several studies have also examined the
effect of structured sentencing laws on prison growth. In general, these
results return numerically and statistically significant negative results,
although in all cases statistical significance is likely overstated.
95
Interpreting these results, however, is difficult, since not all guidelines are
the same: some, for example, focus on constraining correctional
expenditures, others on constraining leniency. 96 Nicholson-Crotty separates
those guidelines concerned with expenditures from those not, and he finds a
negative effect for the former (on the order of 6 per 100,000 fewer total
prisoners and 30 per 100,000 fewer admissions) and a positive effect for the
latter (of around 32 per 100,000 for total populations and 11 per 100,000 for
admissions). Marvell and Moody, who separate out individual states in
their articles, likewise find that guideline effects vary significantly across
states.
B. A BRIEF ASIDE: SMALLER SCALE STUDIES
Those familiar with the literature on prison population growth may
feel that the list of studies in note 58 is incomplete. Much has been written,
for example, on the relationship between unemployment and
incarceration.97 The focus here, however, is on those articles that evaluate
several theories at the same time rather than focusing on the importance of a
single outcome.98 As a result, I exclude those studies that use only a very
94 William D. Berry & Richard Fording, Measuring State Tax Capacity and Effort, 78
Soc. Sci. Q. 158 (1997).
95 None of the studies appears to control for an important source of serial correlation that
afflicts indicator variables for legal changes. See Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo &
Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should We Trust Difference-in-Difference Estimators?,
119 Q.J. ECON. 249 (2004).
96 See Marvell, supra note 58; Marvell & Moody, Determinate Sentencing, supra note
58; Nicholson-Crotty, supra note 58; see also John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of
Structured Sentencing Following Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54
UCLA L. REv. 235 (2006).
97 For a survey of these studies, see Theodore G. Chiricos & Miriam A. Delone, Labor
Surplus and Punishment: A Review and Assessment of Theory and Evidence, 39 SOC. PROBS.
421 (1992).
98 Under this definition, neither Moody nor Marvell themselves may have included their
articles here. In each of their articles, they note that they are focusing on a single question
(the importance of age, the importance of structured sentencing, the importance of parole
abolition) and include variables reflecting the other theories simply as controls to minimize
potential bias in their particular coefficients of interest. Nonetheless, their studies may
provide some insight, at least to the direction and significance-if not the precise
magnitudes--of multiple (secondary) effects.
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small number of controls. If nothing else, the failure to control for wide
ranges of explanatory factors increases the risk of omitted variable bias,
casting doubt on the ability of such narrowly designed articles to accurately
identify even their particular parameters of interest.
The focus here is also on macro-level studies. Many articles examine
sentencing and incarceration trends at the individual level, such as those
that look at how the race or sex of an individual defendant influences a
judge's punishment decision.99 These studies do inform the questions
considered here-if individual-level studies suggest that black defendants
receive longer sentences (all else constant), then they can yield some insight
into the relationship between the size of a state's black population and its
prison population-but the connection is indirect. That said, as future work
at the macro level yields more accurate estimates, the individual-level
studies will provide a valuable source for checking robustness.
C. A BRIEF ASIDE: DECOMPOSITIONAL STUDIES
A common theme across all studies considered here is that they focus
solely on the final outcome, either the incarceration or the admission rate.
If properly estimated, then, the coefficients explain how, say, a one-
percentage-point change in the black population changes the overall
incarceration rate. But the criminal justice system is highly decentralized.
That one knows the effect of an increase in the black population on the
incarceration rate does not imply knowledge of how that effect comes
about. Are blacks more likely to commit crimes, more likely to be arrested
by the police, more likely to be prosecuted or offered stiffer plea bargains
by prosecutors, more likely to be given prison sentences-or longer
sentences-by judges, or more likely to be denied parole by a parole board?
The relevant actors, and the incentives they face, differ at every level of the
criminal justice system, and a complete understanding of prison growth
requires a disaggregated study.
As Greenberg and West note, as of 1999 no such multilevel study had
been conducted, and that does not appear to have changed in the intervening
years.100 But there have been some studies that have sought to examine the
99 Two comprehensive reviews of this literature are Cassia C. Spohn, Thirty Years of
Sentencing Reform: The Quest for a Racially Neutral Sentencing Process, and Marjorie S.
Zatz, The Convergence of Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class on Court Decisionmaking:
Looking Towards the 21st Century, both in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 3 POLICIES,
PROCESSES, AND DECISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2000). Sampson &
Lauritsen, supra note 22, also provide a good summary of these studies.
1oo See Greenberg & West, supra note 58, at 641. This is likely due in part to limitations
in the data. Attempts to find useful data on prosecutorial behavior have generally turned up
little. The only national-level dataset on prosecutorial decisions is the National Prosecutor
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importance of each level of the process to the overall growth rate. In other
words, these "decompositional" studies, such as those by Blumstein and
Beck and by Scott Boggess and John Bound,101 do not try to measure the
importance of race or politics or unemployment to changing patterns in
incarceration, but they look to explain how changing patterns in crimes,
arrests per crime, commitments per arrest, and time served (measured
roughly) explain changing patterns in overall incarceration rates.,0 2 Thus
while informative, these studies provide little information about the
possible causes of the examined trends.
IV. THE PATH FORWARD
The twenty articles considered here have shed light on the forces
influencing prison growth over the past three decades. But as Part III
establishes, methodological and conceptual shortcomings limit the findings.
It is essential, therefore, to develop more accurate and effective approaches.
This Part discusses steps for improving the models we use. In
particular, I focus on four issues: simultaneity bias, other sources of bias
and model dependency, conceptual problems with the chosen variables, and
the need to consider different sources of data. The goal here is not to
address the existence of the problems-that endogeneity can significantly
bias coefficients is well known-but rather to examine how they can be
confronted in this particular context, what information is lost in the process,
and what bounds on knowledge we confront.
A. ENDOGENEITY BIAS AND IDENTIFICATION
A common empirical problem in this literature is the failure to account
for endogenous relationships between prison population and several
explanatory variables. It should not be surprising that an institution such as
the U.S. penal system interacts with social, economic, and political forces in
complex ways. But almost none of the twenty studies addresses these
feedback effects. Only four authors even acknowledge that crime and
Survey ("NPS"), but it is of little use here. First, it is available only biannually from 1990 to
1996, and then again in 2001. Second, the public release masks the identity of the reporting
jurisdiction. And third, the NPS consists only of a random sample of prosecutors' offices,
and the sample is drawn at the national, not state, level. Thus, a key stage of the process
currently appears to defy examination.
1o1 See Blumstein & Beck, supra note 9; Scott Boggess & John Bound, Did Criminal
Activity Increase During the 1980s?: Comparisons Across Data Sources, 78 Soc. Sci. Q.
725 (1997).
102 Noticeably absent is prosecutions per arrest, convictions per prosecution, and
commitments per conviction. Again, this is surely due to the lack of prosecutorial data.
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prison populations are endogenous, 103 and with one exception none
considers any other form of endogeneity.
10 4
At least with respect to crime, an effective device for breaking
endogeneity has already been identified. As Listokin has demonstrated,
abortion is a successful instrument for crime. While abortion rates are
clearly correlated with crime rates, they are unlikely to shift prison
populations except through their effects on crime. Listokin finds that
instrumenting in this way doubles the effect of crime rates on prison
admissions (from an elasticity of approximately 0.5 to approximately 1.0).
This instrument, however, is not without its costs, even beyond those
normally associated with instrumentation.10 5 In particular, it cannot be used
before the early 1990s, since legalized abortion does not appear to influence
crime rates prior to then. 10 6 As a result, regressions looking at data from the
1970s and 1980s cannot use abortion to overcome endogeneity bias. And
since extrapolation may be risky, it is possible that empirical models will
simply be unable to identify the effects of crime prior to the 1990s.
Franklin Zimring, for example, has hypothesized that the forces driving
prison growth have varied across three distinct periods: 1973-1984 (general
crime), 1985-1992 (drugs), and 1993-present (politics).10 7 If correct, this
theory cautions against extrapolation. In this case, it is important to
acknowledge the limits of the empirical model. At least until the discovery
of an alternative identification technique, the effects of crime on prison
populations may be identifiable only from the 1990s onward.
The abortion instrument can impose other, less obvious costs as well-
for example, it may prevent researchers from using data below the state
level (the level at which the abortion data are generally available). Some
investigators, such as Richard Frase, have started to look at county-level
data to examine the intrastate politics of prison growth; even putting aside
103 Listokin explicitly controls for the endogenous relationship; Lessan does so as well,
but unpersuasively. Both articles by Marvell and Moody control for it (improperly, I feel) in
regressions involving prison populations but not in those involving prison admissions. All
other studies in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 fail to address the issue altogether. Charles Cappell and
Gresham Sykes also note the presence of endogeneity but try to control for it using
(unconvincing) exclusion restrictions. Charles Cappell & Gresham Sykes, Prison
Commitments, Crime, & Unemployment: A Theoretical and Empirical Specification for the
United States, 1933-1985, 7 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 155 (1991).
104 Only Marvell & Moody, Determinate Sentencing, supra note 58, acknowledges that
the adoption of sentencing laws may be endogenous, even though six other studies include a
measure of structured sentencing.
105 Instrumentation, for example, often increases the standard errors, reducing the power
of the test. This is more true the weaker the instrument.
106 Donohue & Levitt, Legalized Abortion, supra note 66.
107 Franklin Zimring, Imprisonment Rates and the New Politics of Criminal Punishment,
3 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 161 (2001).
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the more fundamental concerns about the reliability of county-level crime
data, 10 8 the lack of abortion data may hinder identification at the county
level.
Note, however, that the lack of a viable instrument for crime prior to
the 1990s need not imply that no effects during the preceding decades can
be identified, only that certain ones (here, crime) cannot be. Listokin's
results, for example, indicate that the measured effects of unemployment,
personal income, and poverty are robust to crime's endogeneity, with the
coefficients changing only slightly when he controls for endogenous crime
rates. 109  Caution is still needed, of course-In(police per capita), for
example, does change with the correction, from -0.039 to -0.138, with the
difference statistically significant-but at least some forces will likely
remain amenable to longer-run analysis. Fleshing out these implications
more fully, along with their effect on our ability to rigorously test the forces
driving prison populations, is a goal of future work.
While a clear-if limited-solution exists for the problem of
endogenous crime rates, the same cannot necessarily be said for
endogenous unemployment rates. At the very least, one can follow Bruce
Western's lead and adjust unemployment and employment ratios to reflect
the undercounting of the incarcerated." 0  This breaks the statistical
endogeneity, but it still leaves in place the causal endogeneity. Like
endogenous crime rates, endogenous unemployment rates call out for an
instrument: some shock to unemployment that is exogenous with respect to
prison populations. A possible option, for example, may lie in federal
military spending in the states-fewer contracts may exogenously increase
unemployment rates-but the reliability of this instrument is unclear and
needs to be investigated more carefully."' In the absence of a viable
instrument, however, it may be that it is simply impossible to reliably
108 Michael D. Maltz and Joseph Targonski provide a good explanation of the limitations
of county-level Uniform Crime Reports data. See Michael D. Maltz & Joseph Targonski, A
Note on the Use of County-Level UCR Data, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 297 (2002);
see also MICHAEL D. MALTZ, ANALYSIS OF MISSINGNESS IN UCR CRIME DATA (2006),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/215343.pdf.
109 Controlling for simultaneity causes the coefficient on unemployment to shift from
-0.0052 to -0.0053, on In(income per capita) from -1.060 to -1.32 (with the difference
statistically insignificant), and on the poverty rate from -0.013 to -0.010.
110 See WESTERN, supra note 72; see also Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration
and Racial Inequality in Men's Employment, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3 (2000).
"11 This instrument is proposed in Steven Raphael & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Identifying
the Effect of Unemployment on Crime, 44 J.L. & ECON. 259 (2001). Steven D. Levitt,
Alternative Strategies for Identifying the Link Between Unemployment and Crime, 17 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 377 (2001), however, raises some concerns with it.
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identify the effect of unemployment on prison populations, given the
ambiguous direction of the bias.' 
12
While crime and unemployment are two of the most obviously
endogenous variables, they are not the only ones. The adoption of
sentencing guidelines, for example, may be correlated with the
incarceration rate; this can be treated, at least in part, by using state-year
trends."13 Prison capacity may be endogenous as well: more prisoners lead
to more cells, but more cells may lead to more prisoners. Measures of
social disorder such as illegitimate births or divorce rates may likewise be
endogenous, and even factors such as state economic growth. In many of
these cases, the direction of the endogeneity is identifiable: capacity is
biased upwards, economic growth likely downwards. But the magnitude of
the bias cannot be determined, implying that, absent some sort of
exogenous shift, only bounds on the true variable will be estimable. As
discussed in Part IV.B below, this suggests that greater focus should be
placed on isolating particular causal mechanisms and seeking out relevant
quasi-natural experiments.
B. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND INSTABILITY
As noted above, for many variables the estimated effects are highly
unstable, both within and across articles. In some cases, such instability
may arise simply from weak or insignificant underlying effects; in these
cases, the instability is not problematic, but indicative. In others, however,
it may reflect shortcomings in model design. Some of these can be
corrected, but others may result from inherent limitations in the models
considered here.
Instability manifests itself in two ways. First, and more problematic,
the sign of the effect may be unclear. As is clear in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, the
coefficients on unemployment, for example, range widely from positive to
negative, making it difficult to understand the very nature of any effect.
Second, and less problematic, is instability with respect to magnitude. The
effect of crime (or at least violent crime) is consistently positive, but the
magnitudes vary significantly. Such instability allows us to know the
112 Like poverty, unemployment exhibits relatively low levels of variation, especially
intrastate. As a result, the instability of the coefficients may reflect a weak direct effect
(especially in the presence of fixed state and year effects), not problems of bias. But it is
impossible to test that claim with the current data.
113 See Pfaff, supra note 96. Marvell & Moody, Determinate Sentencing, supra note 58,
include these types of trends. Leona Friedberg, Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce
Rates? Evidence from Panel Data, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 608 (1998), discusses this approach
in depth.
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direction of the effect but nothing more. How can we derive more precise
measurements?
The easiest-to-correct source of instability is apparent in Tables 2.1
and 2.2: the wide range in variables used across articles. Models use
different measures of crime, economic conditions, race, age breakdowns,
conservatism, and political pressures. Some of these differences are
grounded in theoretical debates, but many, if explained at all, are justified
as omissions needed to correct for several empirical concerns, particularly
collinearity, measurement error, and insufficient degrees of freedom."
4
Unfortunately, none of these methodological justifications is convincing.
For collinearity, the solution is not to omit variables but rather to test joint
significance. If variables are collinear, we simply cannot isolate individual
effects; this is an epistemic, not a methodological, problem.'15 When the
concern is with errors in the variables, dropping variables replaces
attenuation bias (whose sign is known) with omitted variable bias (whose
sign is not)." l6 And insufficient degrees of freedom indicate the need for
more observations, not fewer variables; it should come as no surprise that
this issue arises only in time-series or cross-sectional studies. Future
models should exclude variables only with great care, relying on joint tests
and expanded sources of data; and they should omit observations only when
tests, such as the Griliches-Hausman test, indicate that it is efficient to do
SO.
The lack of stability across models, however, may reflect a deeper
structural problem. As empiricists increasingly acknowledge, the linear
regression model can yield results that are sensitive to functional form (a
114 For example, articles that drop terms to avoid collinearity include Greenberg and
West; Marvell and Moody, Age-Structure Trends; and Beckett and Western. The articles by
Jacobs and Helms, and Carmichael omit drug offenses as a variable due to concerns about
measurement error. And both Jacobs and Helms, Political Model, and Sorensen and Stemen
rely on stepwise regressions due to a lack of degrees of freedom. (Jacobs and Helms rely on
national time series data, Sorensen and Stemen on a single cross-section of states.)
115 Omission is often justified in the name of precision. But this precision is, of course,
ephemeral, since the purported precision is purchased by biasing the coefficient on the
retained variable.
116 Some articles omit observations to avoid measurement error (in cases like Greenberg
and West, Beckett and Western, and Jacobs and Carmichael, as many as 90% of the
observations are dropped when they limit themselves to one year per decade). This does not
introduce bias, but it does reduce efficiency. This is, in theory, an acceptable tradeoff.
However, tests exist to determine whether the gains in reduced attenuation compensate for
the loss of precision, but none of the articles discussed here employs them. Zvi Griliches
and Jerry Hausman establish the basic method. Zvi Griliches & Jerry Hausman, Errors in
Variables in Panel Data, 33 J. ECONOMETRICS 93 (1986). Steven D. Levitt provides an
intuitive explanation in Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce Crime:
Deterrence, Incapacitation, or Measurement Error?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 353 (1998).
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concern that applies to all. empirical models, not just those relating to prison
growth). 1 7  The prison system's complex interactions with the posited
causal factors suggest that this could be a particular problem-and the
range of results returned across the twenty studies is consistent with this
fear.
At least two adjustments in future work will help minimize instability
and functional-form dependence. First, it is important for empirical models
to focus on one causal factor at a time, rather than trying to test several
causal theories with a single regression.'" Single-cause models are more
amenable to the nonparametric matching protocols suggested by Daniel Ho
and others, the use of which leads to substantially more stable results."
9
These matching protocols confront an important problem: in their absence,
the "treated" and "control" groups can differ systematically, which leads to
instability. One would not trust a medical experiment for an anti-obesity
drug in which the treated group consisted of overweight fifty-year-old men
and the control group underweight twenty-year-old women. A test that
effectively uses New Hampshire as a control for Texas is equally suspect;
preliminary results imply that this problem exists in empirical studies of
prison growth. 1
20
The matching algorithms confront this problem by culling the
"treated" and "untreated" groups-for example, those states that adopt
guidelines and those that do not-so that the two sets are as similar as
possible to each other across all covariates (except that of the treatment, i.e.,
presence of guidelines). As Ho et al. demonstrate, matched results are
significantly more stable and reliable, thus indicating the importance of
attacking one causal theory at a time while still including all covariates.
Each regression for each causal factor will include -all the same set of
covariates, but the "treated" and "control" groups-and thus the matching
results-will differ for each.
117 See, e.g., Ho et al., supra note 76; Alberto Abadie et al., Synthetic Control Methods
for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California's Tobacco Control
Program (NBER Technical Working Paper No. 335), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/t0335. These articles deal with difference-in-difference regressions, but there is no
reason to assume that the instability is any less prevalent in other types of regressions.
118 The models should still include all relevant covariates, but causal inferences should
be drawn only one at a time. As this Part demonstrates, the distinction is not semantic.
119 See Ho et al., supra note 76; Abadie et al., supra note 117. For those familiar with
the technical issues involved in matching, it is important to note that the methods discussed
in these articles do not involve propensity scores. In fact, they have been explicitly designed
to deal with the critical shortcomings of such.
120 In Pfaff, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 1, 1 find that states adopting guidelines
differ systematically from those that do not for many, though not all, relevant covariates
(including population, violent crime rates, personal income, percent of population that is
young men, and citizen ideology).
[Vol. 98
EMPIRICS OF PRISON GRO WTH
In some cases, the treatment variable is inherently discrete, so defining
"treated" and "untreated" is simple: states either have guidelines or do not,
and a year is either an election year or is not. But many other variables do
not lend themselves to such easy categorization, such as the percent of the
population that is black, the per-capita income, or the number of drug
arrests. In some cases, balancing methods can be adapted to continuous
variables," 1 or the variable can be artificially "dichotomized" (into "high"
or "low" numbers of drug arrests, say). In other cases, exogenous shocks to
continuous variables-a discrete break in the time series-may provide
effective quasi-natural treatments. Changes in federal military contracts,
for example, may act as exogenous shocks to unemployment. 122 These
shocks shed light on how (roughly) exogenous changes to these variables
influence prison growth, and they lend themselves more easily to
definitions of "treated" and "control."
Note, too, a collateral benefit of equal importance that arises from
using these shocks: they mitigate the problem of endogeneity. As long as
the shock is uncorrelated with prison population, it breaks the simultaneous
relationship between prison populations and the affected causal factor.
These quasi-experiments, however, do not come without costs. First,
they can be hard to find. A few options suggest themselves-military
expenditures as a shock to unemployment, national political issues as
shocks to state-level elections 123-but for many important causal factors no
viable instrument has yet appeared. 124 Plus, the effect may be identified for
only a short duration. The unemployment rate in year t will change
exogenously with respect to prison populations if a military contract is lost
in that year, but by the next year some endogeneity will already begin to
return. Second, quasi-experimental approaches return fewer results than
structural models. They may provide better estimates of the mean effect,
but they provide less information on other relevant results, such as the
variability of impact. 125  They also may have difficulty measuring
interaction effects (although most models listed in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 do not
account for any such effects either).
121 See, e.g., Kosuke Imai & David A. van Dyk, Causal Inference with General
Treatment Regimes: Generalizing the Propensity Score, 99 J. AM. STAT. AS'N 854 (2004).
122 See Raphael & Winter-Ebmer, supra note 111.
123 For example, several state legislatures changed from Republican to Democratic
control in the 2006 election, perhaps in part due to anti-Republican sentiments arising from
dislike of federal, less than state, policies.
124 Identifying more such shocks is, of course, an important issue for future work.
125 A good discussion of the limitations on such "experimental" approaches is provided
by James J. Heckman & Jeffrey A. Smith, Assessing the Case for Social Experiments, 9 J.
ECON. PERSP. 85 (1995).
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Finally, single-cause models require some way of aggregating results.
The goal is to understand the combined effect of several causal factors on
overall prison rate, and few of the causal factors operate independently.
Guidelines, for example, may influence prison populations directly (by
restraining how judges sentence) as well as indirectly through any
independent effect on the crime rate. To measure the implications of this
indirect effect, we need to know both the effect of guidelines on crime and
the effect of crime on prison populations. 126 It will thus be essential to
synthesize the results from numerous separate quasi-experiments, which
may be challenging.
127
The second significant adjustment needed in future work is the use of
more sophisticated efforts at assessing the robustness of results. Model
sensitivity is an important epistemic limitation, and the standard errors
returned in regression models usually understate the true magnitude of
uncertainty. The errors capture the uncertainty of the estimate given the
particular functional form, but they do not reflect any uncertainty in that
choice of functional form. Daniel Ho and his coauthors provide one way to
explore the significance of this latter form of uncertainty. 28 They regress
the variable of interest (percent black, for example) on the dependent
variable using every possible combination of all other explanatory
variables. 29 They then plot the distribution of the coefficients returned for
percent black, providing a clear sense of the coefficient's sensitivity to
functional form.
A second approach is to employ Bayesian Model Averaging
("BMA"). 3 ° Like the approach set forth by Ho et al., BMA runs
regressions under numerous specifications of the model. Rather than
graphing the resulting set of coefficients, however, BMA uses Bayesian
126 Pfaff, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 1, develops a model to capture these direct
and indirect effects.
127 At one crime and punishment conference, a presenter talking about studies examining
the causes of the crime drop of the 1990s quipped that if one were to add up each study's
claim of the percent of the drop which that study explained, we have by now explained well
over 200% of the drop. The same risk lurks here.
128 See Ho et al., supra note 76.
129 If there are k explanatory variables besides the one of interest, they run
0) 1 additional regressions.
130 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Fagan & John F. Pfaff, Model Uncertainty and the Effect of
Incarceration on Crime: A Bayesian Analysis (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the author); see also William A. Brock, Steven N. Durlauf & Kenneth D. West, Model
Uncertainty and Policy Evaluation: Some Theory and Empirics, 136 J. ECONOMETRICS 629
(2005); Ethan Cohen-Cole et al., Model Uncertainty and the Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment, AM.-L. & ECON. REv. (forthcoming 2008); Jeff Strnad, Should Legal Empiricists
Go Bayesian?, 9 Am. L. & ECON. REv. 195 (2007).
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techniques to develop an average effect across all models and, perhaps more
important, a set of augmented standard errors that accounts for uncertainty
both within and across models. These results are more reliable than those
produced by a single specification.
13 1
C. VARIABLE CHOICE AND CONCEPTUAL CONCERNS
Thus far I have focused on technical statistical concerns. I want to
address now conceptual limitations in the models considered here. Even if
there were no concerns about, say, endogeneity or omitted variable bias, it
is not always clear that the included variables properly measure the effects
they are intended to proxy. The complexity of the prison system indicates
that variables must be chosen carefully, and in many of the studies variables
suffer from significant shortcomings.
Three key problems in particular stand out. The first, and most
significant, applies to regressions looking at the total prison population (as
opposed to admissions). It is likely that no regression, no matter how well
specified, will be able to identify well the forces influencing the total
population, due to the complicated dynamics involved. The second is that
some variables do not necessarily align with the relevant theory: one
variable is used to test two competing claims, or the variable may simply be
too blunt to capture the effect under consideration. And the third is that
using aggregate prison populations or admission rates as the dependent
variable complicates the interpretation of any causal effect, given the
decentralized, hierarchical nature of the criminal justice system.
First, regressions looking at total prison population may not be able to
properly identify any causal effects, suggesting that nineteen of the twenty-
seven models listed in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide little information. Total
prison population is a stock variable, and it is therefore the product of
current and past admissions and releases; and these variables (with the
possible exception of current admissions) are all functions of past
explanatory variables. In other words, the prison population in 2000 is a
function of (among many other things) the number of admissions in 1995
and the number of releases in 1998, and thus a function of the various
forces influencing those admissions and releases (along with the admissions
and releases in other years). With the median sentence length in the United
States hovering around two years, at least two years of lagged variables, if
not more, are needed to begin to explain current total populations. As
131 See Cohen-Cole et al., supra note 130; Fagan & Pfaff, supra note 130.
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Listokin has noted, the dynamics involved in such a model imply that
estimation is challenging at best, and likely impossible.
132
This problem may also apply to prison releases, though perhaps not as
strongly. Unlike the total prison population, releases are a flow, not a stock.
But releases are still highly sensitive to lags: the number of prisoners
released in 1999 is a function of previous years' sentencing choices, which
are shaped in part by past crime rates, distributions of crimes, economic
conditions, demographics, and political pressures. Some simplifying
assumptions, however, may provide an avenue for deriving useful results.'
33
Nonetheless, these dynamic concerns imply that the primary focus
must be on measuring prison admissions. Unlike total population and
releases, admission rates are much less dependent on lagged factors. That is
not to say they are immune from lagged effects-judges may serve long
terms, for example, so political variables at the time of sentencing may not
reflect the politics that placed a particular judge on the bench (and thus the
sentencing behavior of that judge)-but their impact should be markedly
less.
The second key problem is that too many variables may measure the
relevant qualitative factor poorly. Two problems in particular merit
attention. First, a single variable may measure a theory with multiple
prongs. Politics, for example, can influence prison populations either
through the demands of an increasingly conservative polity (as Garland's
end-of-modernity thesis suggests) or through the efforts of politicians using
crime as a wedge issue. Most studies, however, include a single measure,
such as "ideology of citizens" or, more problematically, "percent of the
legislature that is Republican." Such a variable is an amalgam of the two
theories, but it is unclear in what way.134 A similar problem exists with
132 As Listokin puts it, "disentangling the effects of various lags of the crime rate on the
incarceration rate may be nearly impossible." Listokin, supra note 58, at 186. This concern
applies to all explanatory variables.
133 See Pfaff, Trends in Prison Release, supra note 1. Assuming that the number of
prisoners released in 1985 who were committed in 1980 is primarily a function of conditions
in 1980 and 1985 only, for example, opens the door for generating tractable results. Data
from the National Corrections Reporting Program, a surprisingly underused dataset, allow
me to calculate the number of inmates admitted in year t released in year t+k, as well as to
observe several inmate-specific covariates, such as the class of offense for which each was
incarcerated, and the race and sex of the inmate. These data can then be merged with state-
level data for years t and t+k to measure the effect of offender- and state-level variables on
release decisions.
134 That a state with a legislature 60% Republican incarcerates more than one with a
legislature 55% Republican does not necessarily validate the conservative-electorate theory.
Some seats are more stable than others: if more seats in the 60% state are competitive than in
the 55% state, a positive coefficient may in fact be the result of the wedge-issue theory. A
quadratic term may be able to shed some light on this-the wedge-issue theory would
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race. Despite the presence of at least three separate theories linking race to
incarceration-through quotidian racism, through a reaction to civil rights
laws, and through the war on drugs-most studies simply include the
percent of the population that is black. Such a variable may be sufficient
for the first theory, but it is too crude to isolate any role of the latter two.
Either terms must be found that isolate the competing effects, or the
interpretation of the results must confront directly the inherent ambiguity.
The second problem with variable choice is that too little attention is
given to whether more refined variables are available and, if not, what the
coarser variables mask. Turning again to race, the variable commonly used
is the percent of the population that is black. If (as Bruce Western's work
seems to suggest) what matters more is the percent of the state's population
that is young, black, male, and uneducated, what does a simple "percent
black" term tell us? It could be that this variable is the best we have, but
more work is needed to see if more refined terms exist; if they do not, the
analyses need to confront more explicitly the epistemic limitations imposed
by the cruder measures. This is also a problem in the political context,
where attention to legislators and governors overlooks the importance of
mayors, district attorneys, and judges.'35  The focus on the federal
government is misplaced as well-while several articles consider the
importance of presidential elections, none examines the role of federal
financial carrots, such as the funding provided by the Violent Crime
Control Act of 1994 to states that adopted strict truth-in-sentencing laws.
Given that penal policy is predominantly a state endeavor, the latter is likely
more important than the former. And other examples of insufficiently
detailed measures can be found: guidelines, for example, differ in terms of
their focus on resource consumption or punitiveness, but they are generally
modeled as a simple "have/don't have" binary variable.'
36
Again, the point is not to establish an unattainable ideal and then find
all current studies wanting; that crosses the line from idealism to nihilism.
In no model looking at the sociological, political, and economic forces that
drive complex social institutions will the quantitative variables reflect
perfectly the underlying qualitative forces. The key concern here is that the
articles listed in note 58 spend too little time assessing the implications of
predict it to be negative-but no model has yet considered this possibility. Stucky et al.,
supra note 58, suggests a more direct way to disaggregate these two effects.
135 This is surely due in part to limitations in the data. Searches have turned up no
consolidated dataset on electoral returns for or party compositions of judges, mayors, or
district attorneys. Many state secretaries of state have data on such returns, but it is unclear
at this time whether they are in electronic format or would have to be hand-coded.




their variable choices. If sufficiently detailed data are available, they ought
to be used. If not, close attention should be paid to exactly what a particular
coefficient is in fact telling us.
The third conceptual problem arises from the decentralized nature of
the criminal justice system. Even with a well-designed regression, it is hard
to know exactly what the coefficients on the explanatory variables tell us.
For example, assume that a regression with no identification problems
returns a (well-estimated) coefficient on "Percent Black" of 2.0, meaning
that a one-percentage-point increase in the state's black population raises
prison populations by 2 inmates per 100,000 people. What does this mean?
Put differently, if one wanted to change this racial effect, what policy
recommendations emerge from this regression?
The difficulty is that the criminal justice system is composed of
numerous somewhat-independent actors. Once someone commits a crime,
he must be arrested, indicted, convicted, and sentenced; when measuring
the total stock of prisoners, his eventual release date becomes relevant as
well. Each of these stages implicates a separate administrative bureaucracy
with different values: the police, the prosecutors, the courts, the parole
boards. That one additional percentage point of the population being black
increases the incarceration rate tells us little about where that increase
originates: is it due to racially biased decisions by the police, by
prosecutors, by jurors, by judges, by parole boards, or by some combination
of the five? Eliminate the assumption that the regression suffers from no
(other) identification problems, and the question becomes even trickier.
D. LOOKING UNDER THE STREETLIGHT: THE CHOICE OF DATA
A final concern with all the studies considered here is that, despite
their differences, all ultimately look for answers in the same place. Each
study effectively uses the same dependent variable, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics' one-day counts of prison populations or admissions drawn from
approximately fifty states over twenty to sixty years. The explanatory
variables are likewise state-level measures often taken from the same
sources. Specifications may differ, but the models are all roughly the same.
This makes outside verification of results difficult. As others have noted in
the crime context, it is important to consider alternate sources of data.
137
There are two productive routes to consider for future work, namely
looking at other jurisdictions and using different U.S. data sets. There are
(clearly) two jurisdictional options: go smaller or go larger. To go smaller,
one can look at county- or city-level data; Robert Weidner and Richard
137 See, e.g., William Spelman, What Recent Studies Do (and Don't) Tell Us About
Imprisonment and Crime, 27 CRIME & JUST. 419 (2000).
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Frase in particular have started working in this direction with respect to
counties. 138 County-level data allow for more explicit measures of factors
such as urbanization (and its interactions with race and class). They also
permit direct measures of jurisdictional moral hazard problems in criminal
justice. In most states, district attorneys and judges respond to local
political concerns while the state as a whole incurs the cost of each
additional incarceration; concerns with free riding quickly emerge. 139 State-
level data cannot pick up such intrastate politics well. Jeffery Fagan and
others have also demonstrated the benefits of city-level data, which allow
researchers to develop highly contextual models of the forces that influence
prison growth. 140 But such approaches introduce important costs as well.
County and city data, for example, may be less reliable, and errors that
average out at the state level are less likely to do so at smaller levels; this is
a particular concern with crime data.14 ' Also, certain relevant controls (or
instruments, such as abortion rates) may not be available at the county or
city level.
The opposite approach is to look bigger, to the international level.
Here, however, the costs are more noticeable. The underlying differences
between nations are far greater than those between U.S. states, counties, or
cities, and nation-fixed effects can control for these differences only if they
are constant (and nation-year trends only if they change linearly), a
powerful assumption. The relevant factors, then, for which one must
control are much larger. Moreover, nations vary greatly in the type of data
collected and the quality of such data. Nonetheless, some research, such as
that by John Sutton, suggests that valuable insights can be gained by
looking beyond national borders.
42
The second important alternative to consider is different sources of
data within the United States. The National Corrections Reporting Program
138 Robert Weidner, Richard Frase & lain Pardoe, Explaining Sentence Severity in Large
Urban Counties: A Multilevel Analysis of Contextual and Case-Level Factors, 84 PRISON J.
184 (2004); Robert Weidner & Richard Frase, A County-Level Comparison of the Propensity
to Sentence Felons to Prison, 1 INT'L J. COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2001).
139 See, e.g., Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996).
140 Fagan et al., supra note 91.
141 See Maltz & Targonski, supra note 108. It is worth noting, however, that even state-
level crime data appear to be declining in quality. A good summary is given in Jeffrey A.
Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law, and Causal Reasoning on Capital
Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255 (2006).
142 John Sutton, The Political Economy of Imprisonment in Affluent Western
Democracies, 1960-1990, 69 AM. Soc. REv. 170 (2004); John Sutton, Imprisonment and




("NCRP"), for example, compiles annual offender-level data starting in
1983 on every admission to and release from prison for a (growing) sample
of states.' 43 And also since 1983, the biannual National Judicial Reporting
Program ("NJRP") gathers a random sample of offender-level data from a
random sample of counties on criminal case dispositions. Furthermore, and
perhaps most potentially fruitful, many states collect detailed data
themselves on their criminal justice systems. A wider range of data sources
will either increase confidence in the results obtained (if regularities emerge
from well-designed studies) or help isolate problems in the data or in the
models (if irregularities arise).
V. CONCLUSION
Zimring and Hawkins optimistically noted twenty-five years ago that
the lack of empirical research into the growth of prison populations was not
because the question was impossible but simply because few had
considered it. 44 Since then, many studies have focused on this significant
issue, and they have started to shed light on the driving forces. But while
we have learned some from these articles, much still needs to be done.
First, what have we learned? The models looking at admissions
appear to be more robust than those looking at total population; this is not
surprising, given the complicated lags influencing the stock of total
prisoners. Results from the admissions models suggest that unemployment
increases the admissions rate (though the magnitudes vary greatly and are
not always statistically significant), as do the shares of the population that
are between twenty-five and thirty-four years old and that are black.
Listokin's results also indicate that a 1% increase in the crime rate leads to
approximately a 1% change in admissions, and there is evidence that
admissions rates fall as personal income rises. In the models looking at
total prison population, the only consistent results are for the percent of the
population that is between twenty-five and twenty-four years old and that is
black. No other effect is robust across the articles.
But future work can take several steps to generate more accurate
results. To summarize briefly:
1. Closer attention must be given to issues of endogeneity, not just
with respect to crime rates, but unemployment, sentencing guidelines, and
other factors.
2. More care is required in confronting sensitivity to functional form.
At the very least, the data should be balanced and rigorous robustness
143 Pfaff, Trends in Prison Release, supra note 1, uses the NCRP to examine in more
detail the forces influencing release rates since the mid-1980s.
144 ZIMRfNG & HAWKINS, supra note 3.
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checks applied. These will allow us to better appreciate the epistemic
implications of structural sensitivity. But other improvements are possible
as well. One goal is to adopt more consistent sets of estimators to avoid
omitted variable bias. A more significant improvement is to look for more
quasi-natural shocks to many variables of interest.
3. The particular choice of variables demands more consideration.
Prison admissions-and, in certain cases, releases-need to replace total
prison population as the dependent variable. More effort is required to
develop increasingly precise proxies, and ones that can isolate competing
theories related to a particular causal force (such as whether increasing
conservatism or electioneering drives the relationship between politics and
prisons). Furthermore, while focusing on the aggregate admissions rate is
informative, more useful still is a model that examines the role of the causal
factors at each stage of the process (arrest, prosecution, conviction,
admission, release).
4. Studies should seek out alternate sources of data, either looking to
different jurisdictions (counties, nations) or different sets of data (NCRP,
NJRP, state-gathered data).
The current models may not have answered the question of population
growth fully, but they have begun an important process. With more
powerful techniques, better appreciation of particular structural problems,
clearer understandings of how the data look, and careful selection of
relevant explanatory variables, we can-and will--derive increasingly
reliable estimates of the forces shaping prison populations today.
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